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I. INTRODUCTION 
In July 2012, the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) 
celebrated its ten-year anniversary.1 Supporters of the Court believed 
it would usher in a new era where perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
would be held accountable and victims would receive justice.2 
Realpolitik-oriented policy makers, on the other hand, thought the 
Court would be bureaucratically cumbersome, be timid in its 
approach, and shy away from indicting heads of state or senior 
military commanders.3 They did not anticipate that the Court would 
make a significant impact one way or the other on their efforts to 
maintain international peace and security.4 
Without attracting much attention from key policy makers, the 
founding documents of the Court were developed mostly by lawyers 
in the various foreign ministries.5 It was not until the states realized 
 
 1. See 2012: Celebrating the ICC’s 10th Anniversary, COALITION FOR THE 
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icc-10th-anniversary (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2012). 
 2. See The International Criminal Court, HUM. RTS. FIRST, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/crimes-against-humanity/the-
international-criminal-court/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
 3. See Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International 
Criminal Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 432–33 (2004); Courting Disaster?, 
ECONOMIST, May 27, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16219717. 
 4. See Gary T. Dempsey, Reasonable Doubt: The Case Against the Proposed 
International Criminal Court 12 (Cato, Policy Analysis No. 311, July 16, 1998), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-311es.html. 
 5. See U.N. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 
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they would be confronted with a draft treaty to create a permanent 
International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute) that they scrambled 
to develop a full understanding of how it might operate in the 
realpolitik world of foreign affairs. Even at that stage, there was little 
discussion as to how this Court might affect the ability to employ 
traditional methods of inducement and coercion to maintain peace 
and security. 
The International Law Commission, which often takes years to 
consider draft treaties, moved quite rapidly in the wake of the end of 
the Cold War to prepare a draft treaty establishing the Court and 
present it to the United Nations (“UN”) General Assembly.6 The 
Rome negotiations in 1998 were characterized largely by an effort of 
the United States and a handful of other states to ensure that the 
Court fit within the existing architecture, in particular the preeminent 
authority of the UN Security Council to address matters that threaten 
international peace and security.7 In the end, while the Rome Statute 
did provide a role for the UN Security Council, this role was rather 
limited.  
Once created, the Court acted with speed and surprising boldness.8 
This caught policy makers by surprise, given the timid and tardy 
approach of precursor tribunals, such as the Yugoslav Tribunal, 
which took nearly six years to indict the former president of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, for his crimes 
in Bosnia, and then embarked on a five-year trial, during which time 
he passed away.9 
 
Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at Its First, Second and Third 
Sessions, ¶¶ 7, 11–12, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev.1 (Dec. 22, 1999). 
 6. See Chronology of the International Criminal Court, INT’L CRIMINAL 
COURT [ICC], http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+ 
glance/Chronology+of+the+ICC.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
 7. See William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International 
Criminal Court: It’s All About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701, 712–
14 (2004) [hereinafter Schabas, United States Hostility] (referencing Bill 
Richardson, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., as saying that the ICC should work in 
coordination with the U.N. Security Council in order to be effective). 
 8. See Daniel Donovan, International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures 
of the Past and Goals for the Future, INT’L POLICY DIGEST (Mar. 23, 2012), 
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/03/23/international-criminal-court-
successes-and-failures-of-the-past-and-goals-for-the-future/. 
 9. See Leila Nadya Sadat, The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic, ASIL INSIGHTS 
(Oct. 2002), http://www.asil.org/insigh90.cfm (detailing the indictments of 
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The Court has emerged as a dynamic and seemingly omnipresent 
force exerting its influence on the traditional processes for resolving 
international conflicts and maintaining peace and security. Since its 
creation, the Court has exerted its influence in numerous conflicts, 
including those in the Central African Republic (“CAR”), Côte 
d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Libya, Sudan, 
and Uganda.10 Moreover, the Prosecutor has aggressively pursued 
top-level suspects, including Omar Al-Bashir, the president of 
Sudan; Joseph Kony, the head of the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(“LRA”) in Uganda; Laurent Gbagbo, the former president of Côte 
d’Ivoire; Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya’s Deputy Prime Minister; Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, former vice-president of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (“DRC”); and Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, the 
former leader of Libya, and his son Saif Al-Islam Qadhafi.11 
The Court has established itself as an institutional fact of life that 
realpolitik-oriented policy makers must now account for as they seek 
to maintain international peace and security. The Court is unlike any 
other institution operating in the field of peace and security, as it is 
designed to operate largely outside of the usual political process of 
conflict resolution and is guided by the singular interest of justice.12 
An eclectic mix of principles and strategic state interests guides other 
institutions.  
Unlike other international institutions, the Court derives its 
strength not from state interest or economic or military power, but 
from the intrinsic pull of justice—a normative pull universally held 
 
Milosevic for acts committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 and also 
for crimes committed in Kosovo and Croatia); see also Milosevic Found Dead in 
His Cell, BBC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
4796470.stm. 
 10. See generally Situations and Cases, ICC, http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (discussing 
the situations in each of the countries and the role of the Prosecutor). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE 1 (2007) [hereinafter POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE], 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-
73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf (emphasizing that the ICC 
Prosecutor serves the objectives of the Rome Treaty to end impunity and, in doing 
so, is only concerned with the interest of justice, not the interests of peace and 
security defended by other institutions). 
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to some degree by all human beings.13 As such, the Court, possibly 
more so than other institutions, is characterized by a jealous regard 
for its independence, from which it gains much of its legitimacy.14  
Most realpolitik-oriented policy makers, it seems, are to some 
degree uncomfortable with the Court.15 Their discomfort arises not 
because the Court is fueled by the norm of justice, but because it 
operates outside, yet has such a significant impact on, the traditional 
process for maintaining international peace and security.16 While the 
Court may at times be a useful tool in helping policy makers 
accomplish their objectives, it is a tool that they do not formally 
control, and one that can have a variety of unintended 
consequences.17 For highly skilled professionals trained in the 
realpolitik world of power and state interests, this can be unsettling. 
Many policy makers seem to prefer that the Court pursue issues of 
justice at the close of the conflict, not during the conflict while 
diplomats are primarily concerned with maintaining peace and 
security by managing the delicate balance of economic, military, and 
social power.18 
The Court, however, has become intertwined with the political 
 
 13. See James A. Goldston, The International Criminal Court: Justice and 
Politics, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.opendemocracy.net/ 
james-goldston/international-criminal-court-justice-and-politics (quoting U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan calling the founding of the Court a “victory for 
justice”). 
 14. See Sarah Sewall & Carl Kaysen, The United States and the International 
Criminal Court: The Choices Ahead, AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCI., 
http://www.amacad.org/projects/iccarticle.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2012). 
 15. See Robert Cryer, International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: 
Another Round?, 16 EURO. J. INT’L L. 979, 980 (2005). 
 16. See John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International 
Criminal Court from America’s Perspective, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 169 
(2001). 
 17. See JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., THE ICC AT EIGHT—ASSESSING US POLICY & 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: RECIPROCAL INFLUENCES 93 (2010), available  
at http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/homeland-security/ 
THE_ICC_AT_EIGHT.pdf. 
 18. See, e.g., HAMISH FALCONER ET AL., WAGING PEACE, MATCHING WORDS 
WITH ACTION: HOW TO PRESSURE SUDAN TO STOP ITS GENOCIDAL CAMPAIGN IN 
DARFUR 12 (Mar. 25, 2007), http://www.wagingpeace.info/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=121&Itemid=35 (discussing China’s change in 
diplomatic and economic policies toward Sudan in an effort to pressure the 
Sudanese into action with regard to Darfur). 
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process of guaranteeing peace and security.19 While the Court draws 
its potency from the normative demands of justice, in reality, justice 
is also subject to political interests, state power, and the political 
process.20 In addition, the Court exerts its own influence on political 
efforts to ensure peace and security, sometimes even contributing to 
an alteration of the balance of power.21 In this way, it inches ever 
closer to the realm of the realpolitik policy makers, thereby 
increasing their discomfort with the Court. 
This state of affairs has set the stage for a seemingly perpetual 
clash of the Titans, with the ICC and other mechanisms of justice in 
one group of powerful actors, and realpolitik-oriented policy makers 
and the state institutions they operate in another group of even more 
powerful actors.22 Just like the pre-Olympian Titans of Greek 
mythology, these groups often clash as they are driven by divergent 
desires (in the modern arena: justice on the one hand, and stability 
and the protection of national interests on the other). Nonetheless, at 
times, they can also cooperate in the pursuit of a common objective 
(in the modern arena: peace).  
Whether cooperative or discordant, the relationship between the 
Court’s activities and realpolitik efforts to maintain peace and 
security is embryotic, complex, and rapidly evolving.23 This article is 
directed to policy makers who are perplexed and often frustrated by 
this independent actor; it is equally directed to advocates of justice 
frustrated by the perceived efforts of some policy makers to constrain 
justice. A better understanding of each perspective will yield a more 
 
 19. See, e.g., Statement by H.E. Mr. Kazuo Kodama, Open Debate of the 
Security Council on the Promotion and Strengthening of the Rule of Law in the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, PERMANENT MISSION OF JAPAN 
TO THE UNITED NATIONS, www.un.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/kodama 
101712.html (Oct. 17, 2012) (statement of Deputy Permanent Representative of 
Japan to the U.N. H.E. Mr. Kazuo Kodama). 
 20. See Miroslav Baros, The International Criminal Court and the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security: A Marriage of Convenience? 2, 
6 (Sheffield Hallam U., Working Paper, Nov. 7, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1955827. 
 21. See Baros, supra note 20, at 2. 
 22. See Samwel Mukira Mohochi, Jurisdiction of the ICC: The Realpolitik by 
State Parties to the Rome Statute and United Nations Security Council in Its 
Efficaciousness 5–6 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished LLM thesis), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1847474&download=yes. 
 23. See id. at 2–3. 
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effective tool for promoting durable resolutions of conflicts that 
threaten international peace and security. This article will describe 
six primary questions that policy makers and justice advocates 
should consider regarding the role of international justice 
mechanisms and realpolitik in conflict settings. It also uses the recent 
events in Libya as a case study designed to help further understand 
the relationship between the Court and policy makers.  
Part II, “The Rise and Perseverance of International Justice,” 
describes how the norm of justice came to play a role in efforts to 
maintain international peace and security. It also details why this 
norm was incarnated into a permanent body, with a perceived 
entitlement to operate independently and with limited regard to the 
consequences for major state players and institutions in their efforts 
to maintain international peace and security. 
Part III, “Deploying Justice,” explains how the ICC, particularly 
through its political mechanisms and consequences, becomes 
involved in international efforts to maintain international peace and 
security. The section further describes the role of strategic state 
interests in the deployment of justice. 
Part IV, “Managing Justice,” notes the few political constraints 
that exist on the efforts of the ICC as it proceeds in indicting and 
prosecuting suspected criminals. Part V, “Justice and the 
Battlefield,” delves into the extent to which investigations or 
indictments by the ICC may help legitimize the use of force to 
maintain international peace and security.  
Part VI, “Justice and the Peace Table,” describes the extent to 
which actions by the ICC may promote or inhibit efforts to reach a 
negotiated solution to a conflict threatening international peace and 
security. Finally, Part VII, “Justice and Post-Conflict Stability,” 
describes to what extent conflicts or synergy arise between the ICC 
and national efforts to prosecute those responsible for crimes, and 
how this affects post-conflict stability. 
Each section will briefly restate the question, place the question in 
the context of other contemporary conflicts, and then delve into how 
the question was addressed in the context of the Libyan conflict. 
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II. THE RISE AND PERSEVERANCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
How did the norm of justice come to play a role in efforts to 
maintain international peace and security? And why did this 
norm manifest itself into a permanent body, with a perceived 
entitlement to operate independently, regardless of its 
consequences for the efforts of major state players and 
institutions in maintaining international peace and security? 
The concept of international justice started to play a role in efforts 
to maintain international peace at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.24 The laws of war were codified comprehensively for the 
first time in several international treaties: the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions.25 At the time, states determined that since armed 
conflict was sometimes unavoidable and necessary to serve the 
interests of humanity and civilization, they should implement a 
general code of conduct for armed conflict.26 States believed that 
such a code of conduct would reduce the evils of war and curtail 
potentially arbitrary actions of military commanders.27 At the same 
time, these treaties were not intended to create criminal liability for 
individuals; rather, they imposed obligations and duties on states.28 
Over the next fifty years, perspectives on the acceptance of armed 
conflict and the legality of war evolved significantly. This transition 
started with the 1919 League of Nations Covenant, which reflected 
nineteenth-century notions that resorting to war was permissible if 
 
 24. See Richard Goldstone, SA Leads the Way in Standing Up Against War 
Criminals, IJ CENTRAL (Sept. 27, 2010), http://ijcentral.org/topics/tag/ 
international+justice. 
 25. See generally Hague Convention, ENCYC. BRITANNICA ONLINE (Oct. 14, 
2012), http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/251644/Hague-Convention. 
 26. See Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631, 632 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention IV]; Hague Convention No. II Multilateral Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247, 248 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention II]. 
 27. See Hague Convention IV, supra note 26, at 632; Hague Convention II, 
supra note 26, at 248. 
 28. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 2 (2007) [hereinafter SCHABAS, INTRODUCTION]. See generally 
Hague Convention IV, supra note 26; Hague Convention II, supra note 26. 
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certain procedures were exhausted.29 These procedures included a 
meeting of the Council of the League of Nations; submission of any 
conflicts to arbitration, judicial settlement, or the Council; and the 
severance of trade and financial relations.30 The 1928 General Treaty 
for the Renunciation of War followed.31 This legally binding 
multilateral treaty, agreed to by a number of states including the 
United States, Japan, Germany, France, and Great Britain, 
represented a commitment not to resort to war for the resolution of 
conflicts.32 
After World War II, the United Nations replaced the League of 
Nations, an institution that many believed to be deeply flawed due to 
its inability to prevent the war.33 The purpose of the UN was to 
prevent a third world war by promoting international peace and 
security, human rights, social and economic progress, and respect for 
international obligations.34 The UN also represented a neutral forum 
for dialogue and cooperation among states. Several different bodies 
comprise the UN, including organs focused on international peace 
and security as well as justice.35 For instance, the UN Security 
Council was created to maintain peace and security, and it can take 
measures that are binding on all states.36 The International Court of 
Justice is the UN’s principal judicial organ and tries cases between 
states in disputes arising from alleged violations of international 
law.37  
Concurrent to the creation of the United Nations, the victorious 
allies created the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals to try the military 
leadership of Germany and Japan for alleged war crimes. These trials 
 
 29. See Covenant of the League of Nations arts. 11–17, reprinted in 1 
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 16 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1931) [hereinafter 
League of Nations]; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
697 (2003). 
 30. See League of Nations, supra note 29, arts. 11–17. 
 31. See generally Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, Renunciation of War as an 
Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 2 Bevans 732. 
 32. See id. at 732. 
 33. See History of the United Nations, U.N., http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/ 
history/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2012). 
 34. See U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1. 
 35. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (highlighting the scope of the U.N. Security Council). 
 36. See U.N. Charter chs. V, VII. 
 37. See U.N. Charter ch. XIV. 
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are often thought of as the first modern international prosecutions for 
war crimes.38 The relative success of the tribunals led some observers 
to conclude that there might be a serious role for justice as a part of 
efforts to maintain international peace and security. 
As such, the United Nations began to consider the creation of a 
permanent, impartial tribunal that could try individuals responsible 
for international crimes. At the request of the UN General Assembly, 
the International Law Commission prepared a draft code of 
international crimes against peace and security.39 Concurrently, a 
special rapporteur was tasked with drafting a statute that would 
establish an international criminal court.40 This special committee 
submitted its first draft to the International Law Commission in 
1950, followed by a second draft in 1951 that was revised in 1953.41 
With the onset of the Cold War, these efforts were suspended.42  
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the genocidal conflict 
raging in the former Yugoslavia, and in the hope that it might help 
bring an end to the conflict, there was a renewed push in the 1990s to 
create an international tribunal to enforce the laws of war.43 In many 
ways, the re-emergence of international justice mechanisms arose 
from the failure of the international community to take effective 
military action to stop the atrocities in Yugoslavia.44 On October 6, 
1992, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution 
calling for the creation of a Commission of Experts to investigate 
 
 38. See ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR., The Influence of the Nuremberg Trial on 
International Criminal Law, http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-
articles/speeches/speeches-related-to-robert-h-jackson/the-influence-of-the-
nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) 
(commenting that, while these trials are thought of as biased or unfair, they created 
the framework for international criminal law). 
 39. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 323 (2008). 
 40. See id. at 323. 
 41. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, 
UNITED NATIONS (June 30, 2005), http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_2.htm. 
 42. See CASSESE, supra note 39, at 324. 
 43. See PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE xvii–
xix (2002). 
 44. See, e.g., MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 
96404, BOSNIA WAR CRIMES: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND U.S. POLICY 1–2 (1998), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/96-404.pdf (stating that the U.N. Security Council 
established the first international tribunal against war crimes in fifty years 
following the conflict in the former Yugoslavia). 
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war crimes and other serious violations of international law in former 
Yugoslavia.45 Although the Security Council assumed this 
Commission would take many months, if not years, to investigate the 
allegations of atrocities, the Commission rapidly completed its work 
and publicly recommended the creation of a Yugoslav tribunal.46  
In May 1993, while the conflict was still raging, the United 
Nations Security Council responded by creating the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“Yugoslav Tribunal”) 
to administer justice.47 Some commentators argued that this decision 
was driven in large part by the desire to be seen as taking decisive 
action and to reduce political pressure to use force to end the 
conflict.48 While the Yugoslav Tribunal was largely timid and tardy 
in the dispensation of justice, it did eventually indict Slobodan 
Milosevic, the former president of Yugoslavia and the main architect 
of the genocide in the Balkans.49 
Shortly after the creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the United 
Nations Security Council created a second international tribunal 
tasked with enforcing international justice. This new entity, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“Rwanda Tribunal”) 
was created after the conflict in Rwanda had ended and was charged 
with determining the guilt and punishment of those responsible for 
the genocide of 800,000 Rwandans.50 Many commentators viewed 
the creation of the Rwanda Tribunal as much as an expression of 
 
 45. See S.C. Res. 780, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (Oct. 6, 1992). 
 46. See Fausto Pocar, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. OF INT’L L. 1 (2008), available at 
www.un.org/law/avl (recounting that the Commissioner of Experts presented its 
recommendations on February 6, 1993, and the Security Council approved the 
establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal on May 25, 1993). 
 47. See generally S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 48. See CASSESE, supra note 39, at 326. 
 49. See CASSESE, supra note 39, at 326; MIKYUNG LEE ET AL., supra note 44, 
at 21 (noting that, without the substantial political and financial support of the 
United States government and the non-profit sector, the Yugoslav Tribunal may 
never have survived its early months); WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 43, at 
xvii; Sadat, supra note 9 (discussing how the three indictments against Milosevic 
were the first to be presented to a sitting head of state by an international tribunal). 
 50. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UNICTR, 
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2012); Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS (Dec. 
18, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.stm. 
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guilt for the failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide as an 
instrument to pursue justice.51 
The decade following the creation of these two international 
tribunals experienced the emergence of hybrid or sui generis 
tribunals comprising both international and domestic elements.52 The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (“Sierra Leone Tribunal”) was 
established by agreement between the United Nations and the 
government of Sierra Leone to prosecute those who carried the 
greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes in Sierra 
Leone.53 This tribunal, created at the end of the conflict,54 was 
intended to promote justice and healing.55 Interestingly, in addition to 
indicting both senior members of the Sierra Leone government as 
well as rebel groups, the Sierra Leone Tribunal also indicted Liberian 
President Charles Taylor for his role in supporting the rebels.56 It 
thus entwined itself with the efforts of policy makers seeking to 
promote peace and stability in neighboring Liberia as well.57 The 
Sierra Leone Tribunal was supported in large part by funding and 
 
 51. See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 39, at 327. 
 52. See Anna Triponel & Stephen Pearson, What Do You Think Should 
Happen? Public Participation in Transitional Justice, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 103, 
110–12 (2010) (explaining that hybrid tribunals apply a blend of international and 
national law and often take place within the country where the crimes took place). 
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 56. See The Prosecutor vs. Charles Gankay Taylor, SPECIAL COURT FOR 
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107/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) (detailing the indictment and 
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other resources from the United States, whose policy makers thought 
the tribunal might help to secure a lasting peace in Sierra Leone and 
deter similar crimes in the future.58 Notably, this tribunal was 
coupled with a truth commission responsible for the creation of an 
accurate historical record of the human rights abuses that occurred 
during the conflict to, in turn, promote community dialogue, healing, 
and reconciliation.59  
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia followed. 
The negotiations behind the creation of these chambers, which were 
tasked with prosecuting senior members of the Khmer Rouge, were 
politically sensitive and only led to the establishment of the court 
over two decades after the end of the conflict.60  
Negotiations between players in the international justice arena 
continued with the creation of two additional tribunals.61 The 
government of Iraq created the Iraqi Special Tribunal in 
collaboration with the United States to try high-level members of the 
Ba’ath Party regime accused of crimes committed between 1968 and 
2003.62 The international community, however, shunned the tribunal 
because it allowed the death penalty.63 Uganda created the Uganda 
 
 58. See SARA KENDALL & MICHELLE STAGGS, BERKELEY WAR CRIMES 
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 59. See Truth Commission: Sierra Leone, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Nov. 2002), 
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-sierra-leone (finding that the 
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 60. See David Scheffer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1–10 (Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008) 
(citing governmental restructuring in Cambodia and later in the United States, as 
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 61. See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 1, Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 
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 62. See IST Statute, supra note 61, art. 1. 
 63. See, e.g., Iraq: Don’t Add Death Penalty to Dujail Sentence, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Feb. 12, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/02/11/iraq-don-t-add-
death-penalty-dujail-sentence; Thalif Deen, Death Penalty: U.N. Faults Iraq for 
Continued Executions, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 5, 2007, available at 
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International Crimes Division (“Uganda Tribunal”) within Uganda’s 
judiciary to prosecute senior leaders of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army.64 It too was criticized for its acceptance of the death penalty.65 
Critiques also focused on Uganda’s sweeping amnesty laws and the 
Uganda Tribunal’s failure to prosecute international crimes prior to a 
certain date, despite their universality.66  
Most recently, Côte d’Ivoire created a Special Cell of 
Investigations into the Crimes Committed during the Post-Election 
Crisis to investigate those responsible for violence following the 
2010 elections.67 The investigations are intended to lead to 
prosecutions using both civil and military tribunals within the 
existing judiciary. Other tribunals, such as the Bosnia War Crimes 
Chamber, the mobile courts of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh, and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon also operate within the existing national 
judiciary or resemble domestic tribunals with international elements, 
which is an emerging trend.68  
 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2007/09/death-penalty-un-faults-iraq-for-continued-
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away from the death penalty in the international legal community). 
 64. See Uganda: War Crimes Trials Face Challenges, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 
16, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/15/uganda-war-crimes-trials-face-
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ranking criminals); Jurisdiction, Organization, and Structure of the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, COURT OF BOSN. & HERZ., http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/ 
?opcija=sadrzaj&kat=3&id=3&jezik=e (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) (highlighting 
the structure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina tribunal); Fact Sheet: Democratic 
Republic of Congo Mobile Gender Courts, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS. (July 19, 2011), 
http://www.soros.org/publications/fact-sheet-democratic-republic-congo-mobile-
gender-courts (noting the Democratic Republic of Congo has created a mobile 
court using its justice system to try mass rape and other crimes); Jon Lunn & 
Arabella Thorp, Bangladesh: the International Crimes Tribunal — Commons 
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In parallel to the creation of some of the first ad hoc tribunals, 
plans for the creation of a permanent international criminal tribunal 
started once again. Following the end of the Cold War, the UN 
General Assembly renewed the International Law Commission’s 
mandate to draft a statute for an international court, which it did in 
1993 and amended the following year.69 In 1996, the General 
Assembly established the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, a group composed 
of member states as well as non-governmental and international 
organizations, and tasked it with submitting a draft statute to the 
Diplomatic Conference in Rome.70 Delegates from some 150 states 
attended along with representatives from hundreds of organizations.71 
Working groups adopted provisions that were then reviewed by the 
Drafting Committee, chaired by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni.72  
The rapid, month-long negotiations in Rome successfully led to 
the establishment of the ICC to prosecute perpetrators of the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community, including 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The Court 
entered into force on July 1, 2002, after sixty states had ratified its 
founding treaty, the Rome Statute.73  
A split in opinion within the United States administration toward 
the ICC resulted in the lack of an orchestrated strategy toward the 
Court.74 Ultimately, the Clinton administration signed on to the 
 
Library Standard Note, UK PARLIAMENT (May 3, 2012), 
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06318; Unique Features, SPECIAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/unique-features (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2012) (expressing criticism that the re-established domestic 
tribunal in Bangladesh may not meet international standards and proclaiming that 
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 69. See CASSESE, supra note 39, at 317, 328. 
 70. See id. at 329. 
 71. See Michael P. Scharf, Rome Diplomatic Conference for an International 
Criminal Court, ASIL INSIGHTS (June 1998), http://www.asil.org/insigh20.cfm. 
 72. SCHABAS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 28, at 20. 
 73. See About the Court, ICC, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/ 
About+the+Court/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2013); see also Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 2002 
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 74. See Schabas, United States Hostility, supra note 7, at 719 (concluding that 
the U.S. intransigence toward the ICC was due in part to differences between 
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Rome Statute a few minutes before the December 31, 2000 
deadline.75 However, following the signing, the United States exerted 
tremendous political effort to shield itself from the reach of the 
Court. On May 6, 2002, the Bush administration withdrew the U.S. 
signature from the treaty.76 The United States then formed bilateral 
agreements with more than 100 states to preclude those states from 
surrendering an American national to the Court.77 In 2002, the United 
States announced that it would veto UN Security Council resolutions 
regarding collective security and peacekeeping operations so long as 
the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that, in effect, 
excluded members of these operations from the ICC’s jurisdiction.78 
Thus, the signing and ratification of the Rome Statute became a 
political issue, a situation that ultimately inhibited a serious 
discussion of its strategic utility. States positioned themselves either 
for or against the Court, and the discourse contained little emphasis 
on the manner in which the Court might operate. In addition, 
international criminal law was initially an evolving concept without 
consensus on how best to address it.79 This political divide precluded 
efforts by both justice-oriented actors and policy makers to assess 
how the Court might fit into the broader array of tools used to 
maintain international peace and security.80  
Of course, this is not an exhaustive account of the rise and 
perseverance of justice. Other factors—among them the growth of 
mass media, the liberalization that followed the fall of the Soviet 
Union, and growing attention paid to conflict and devastation—play 
important roles in establishing and maintaining international 
accountability. While falling outside the ambit of this article, these 
factors, and others, play important roles in the manifestation of 
justice and peace in the international community.  
 
 75. SCHABAS, INTRODUCTION, supra note 28, at 28. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 29. 
 78. Id. at 30. 
 79. Cf. JOLYON FORD, BRINGING FAIRNESS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 12 
(2009) (indicating that international criminal law was an evolving issue at the time 
without a lot of experts). 
 80. See, e.g., Anup Shah, United States and the International Criminal Court, 
GLOBAL ISSUES (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.globalissues.org/article/490/united-
states-and-the-icc (discussing how U.S. efforts to get immunity for their personnel 
from the ICC undermined the entire point behind the organization). 
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In sum, the ad hoc tribunals were not created as part of a strategic 
effort to maintain international peace and security. Established in lieu 
of an orchestrated policy, many of the international tribunals were 
created after periods of conflict to assuage guilt for non-
intervention.81 Accordingly, these purported organs of international 
justice were anything but a carefully crafted tool designed to 
complement the other tools in the realpolitik policy maker’s toolbox. 
This foundation helped set the framework for the tension between 
policy makers and justice advocates regarding the role and mandate 
of the ICC. 
III. DEPLOYING JUSTICE 
How does the ICC come to be involved in international efforts 
to maintain international peace and security, and what role do 
strategic state interests play in deploying justice? To what degree 
are these actors in tension or cooperation? 
While the preceding section explained how justice came to be 
institutionalized within the arena of peace and conflict resolution in 
the form of the ICC and ad hoc tribunals, this section discusses when 
and how the mechanism of the ICC is deployed and how it can be 
used to aid in efforts to resolve conflicts and maintain international 
peace and security.  
This section describes the four primary ways in which the ICC can 
be called into action, and it briefly notes the consequences of doing 
so in various instances. Specifically, it discusses the inherently 
political nature of the decision to activate the ICC on a particular 
matter and the subsequent relationship between the ICC and the 
political actors’ efforts to maintain international peace and security. 
The section highlights the tension that arises from the activation of 
the ICC. On the one hand, the deployment of the ICC is initially and 
appropriately a political act, both in mechanics and motivation, 
aimed at least in part to promote peace and security. But on the other 
hand, once the ICC is deployed, it operates as an independent 
authority guided by the principle of justice—not necessarily by 
prioritizing peace and security. Policy makers do not fully grasp the 
shift from political activation to independent operation, as well as the 
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underlying motivations of the Court and its consequences on the 
peace process. This information gap causes substantial friction 
between policy makers and the ICC. As a case study, this section 
explores in depth the political decision of the UN Security Council to 
activate the ICC in the case of Libya and briefly examines the current 
(as of July 2012) decision not to activate the ICC in the case of Syria. 
Finally, this section discusses the activation of the ICC through 
referral. 
A. ACTIVATING THE ICC 
The ICC can be deployed into the conflict resolution process in 
four ways: referral by a state party to the Rome Statute; by the 
initiation of the Prosecutor based on the prior consent of a state as a 
state party to the Rome Statute; by the initiation of the Prosecutor 
based on the request of a non-state party to the Rome Statute; or by 
the UN Security Council.82 In all cases, for the ICC to be deployed, 
there must be a reasonable belief that atrocity crimes (genocide, 
crimes against humanity, or war crimes) have occurred or are 
occurring.83 Furthermore, such crimes must have occurred after July 
1, 2002 (the entry into force of the Rome Statute)84 and must have 
been properly referred to the Court.85 
1. State Party Referral  
The political leadership of a state can decide that it would like to 
be subjected to the jurisdiction of the ICC in the event that atrocity 
crimes occur on its territory or by its nationals.86 To do so, the state 
signs and ratifies the Rome Statute. To date, more than 120 states 
have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC by becoming parties to the 
 
 82. Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICC, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/ 
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ility?lan=en-GB (last visited Jan. 3, 2013) (explaining that the International 
Criminal Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and can only initiate proceedings 
against a person if it has jurisdiction over that person for the alleged misconduct, 
which requires that the Court have (1) subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) temporal 
jurisdiction, and (3) territorial jurisdiction). 
 83. Rome Statute, supra note 73, arts. 5, 8. 
 84. Id. art. 11(1) (providing that the effective date may be later if the statute 
entered into force after July 1, 2012). 
 85. See Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 82. 
 86. Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 12(2). 
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Rome Statute.87 Once a state has subjected itself to the jurisdiction of 
the Court, it can subsequently request that the Court launch an 
investigation of alleged atrocity claims.88 
Notably, the ICC received its first three cases by referrals from 
state parties to the Rome Statute—Uganda, the DRC, and CAR.89 In 
each case, the political leadership of the state determined that 
involving the ICC would in some way contribute to resolving 
conflict and promoting peace and security. In such cases, the political 
nature of the activation of the Court is both mechanical and 
motivational. That is, a political actor made the request to activate 
the Court, and the decision to make such a request is influenced in 
part by political concerns.  
For instance, in 2003 the Ugandan government referred to the ICC 
the matter of atrocities committed by the LRA in northern Uganda.90 
The Prosecutor’s office subsequently launched an investigation and 
issued an arrest warrant for five LRA leaders including Joseph Kony, 
commander-in-chief of the LRA.91 Similarly, the DRC referred the 
matter of atrocities committed in the Ituri region to the ICC.92 The 
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 90. See Press Release, ICC, President of Uganda Refers Situation  
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794 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:3 
subsequent investigation led to the ICC’s first conviction on March 
14, 2012, of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, rebel leader in the Ituri conflict, 
for the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the 
age of fifteen and using them to participate actively in hostilities.93 
The government of the CAR also referred a situation in its territory 
to the ICC, which led to the trial of former vice president of the 
DRC, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.94 
Tension perceived by policy makers between state parties’ 
political activation of the ICC and the Court’s independent operation 
has begun to surface.95 For instance, having made the political 
decision to sign onto the Rome Statute, and while initially 
enthusiastic about the engagement of the ICC in efforts to promote 
peace and security, Uganda and the DRC have come to believe that 
the ICC’s efforts might be constraining their ability to promote 
peace. The Ugandan government has sought to assert a principle 
called complementarity to prosecute individuals involved in the 
conflict and referred to the ICC domestically,96 and the DRC has 
been slow to cooperate with the ICC after referral.97  
In the case of Uganda, where the ICC indicted five leaders of the 
LRA including its supreme leader Joseph Kony, the government and 
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(2011). 
 97. See id. at 41 (noting that, while the DRC has cooperated with most ICC 
requests, it still failed to arrest rebel leader Bosco Ntaganda for its own internal 
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the ICC have been under domestic pressure for keeping secret the 
terms of the referral to the Court.98 Furthermore, there is a perception 
that the terms only charge the LRA and not the government.99 As a 
result, the local population in the territory where the crimes were 
committed has become quite hostile to the ICC.100 In one notable 
instance, a local radio station broadcasted the license plate number of 
the car used by the ICC investigators to limit their ability to conduct 
their investigation.101  
The political decision not to cooperate with the ICC also results in 
tension between the search for justice and the promotion of peace 
and security. In the case of the DRC, for instance, the ICC indicted 
the rebel leader General Bosco Ntaganda, who the DRC government 
integrated into the DRC army through a reconciliation program.102 
Despite repeated calls by the Prosecutor for his arrest, the DRC, 
supported by other member states in the international community, 
refused to arrest General Bosco Ntaganda on the basis that 
integration of rebel forces into the army was key to peace and 
stability.103 General Ntaganda, however, subsequently defected from 
his new position and returned to the bush where he has allegedly 
committed further atrocity crimes.104 The DRC’s course of action 
arguably resulted in neither justice nor peace and security. 
2. Initiation by the Prosecutor Relating to a State Party  
The Prosecutor can also independently initiate an investigation of 
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a state party to the Rome Statute.105 If sufficiently serious evidence 
exists to justify an investigation, the Prosecutor submits a pre-trial 
request for investigation, along with supporting evidence.106 If the 
Pre-Trial Chamber agrees that there is a “reasonable basis to proceed 
with investigation,” it can authorize a full investigation.107  
The Prosecutor, per the permission of the ICC, initiated an 
investigation108 following the failure of the Kenyan government to 
create a special tribunal as recommended by the Kenyan 
Commission of Inquiry in the 2007–2008 Post-Election Violence.109 
At the time, many Kenyans as well as meditator and former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan believed that justice might cool the 
tensions that led to the electoral violence and prevent its recurrence 
in the next round of elections.110 They also hoped that indictments 
might remove key individuals from the political scene. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the Prosecutor moved quickly to indict top-level 
government officials, including Deputy Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of former President Kenyatta.111  
Again in the case of Kenya, tension emerged as the Court shifted 
from political activation to independent operation. Almost 
immediately, the Kenyan government sought to undermine the 
authority of the Court by seeking to delegitimize it.112 The Kenyan 
government also unsuccessfully sought a deferral of the case by the 
UN Security Council under Article 16 of the Rome Statute and by 
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formally challenging the Court’s jurisdiction.113 The Kenya case 
provides another illustration of the possible tension between the 
goals of policy makers and justice advocates, and the shift between 
political activation and subsequent independent operation of the 
Court. While those in favor of activation believed that doing so 
would lead to both justice and the furtherance of peace, policy 
makers within the Kenyan government either disagreed or favored an 
alternate course to promoting peace and security. The Court’s 
mandate, however, gave it the authority to proceed independently 
following its activation.114  
3. Non-State Party Referrals 
States that are not parties to the Rome Statute may request that the 
Court exercise its jurisdiction over a particular conflict. Upon such a 
request, the Prosecutor seeks permission from a panel of ICC judges 
to initiate an investigation.115 
Côte d’Ivoire is not a party to the Rome Statute.116 However, 
shortly after contested results in the presidential election of 
November 2010 led to violence, President Ouattara called on the ICC 
Prosecutor to investigate the post-election violence.117 The 
Prosecutor accordingly requested authorization from ICC judges to 
open an investigation into the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed in Côte d’Ivoire following the 
 
 113. Kenya: Impact of the ICC Proceedings, INT’L CRISIS GRP., Jan. 9, 2012,  
at 9, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-
africa/kenya/B084%20Kenya%20----%20Impact%20of%20the%20ICC%20 
Proceedings.pdf. 
 114. Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 15(2). 
 115. Id. art. 15 (identifying this mechanism to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction as 
a proprio motu investigation). 
 116. See New Suspect in the ICC’s Custody: Laurent Gbagbo Arrived at the 
Detention Centre, ICC (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/ 
4814FA54-AF2D-4EA3-8A89-9E809318D1D8.htm. 
 117. See, e.g., Letter from Alassane Ouattara, President of Cote D’Ivoire, 
Confirming Acceptance of ICC Jurisdiction (May 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/7DA08D8E-FF5E-40C8-92D7-F058D5B032 
F3/283315/LetterOuattaratoOTP030511%20.pdf; Côte d’Ivoire: Alassane 
Ouattara Demande à la CPI d'enquêter, RFI (May 19, 2011), 
http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20110519-cote-ivoire-alassane-ouattara-cpi-enquete; see 
also U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, On the Situation of Human 
Rights in Cote d’Ivoire, para. 34, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/52 (Sept. 20, 2011). 
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presidential election.118 Ivorian leaders believed ICC intervention to 
be the best option to prevent resurgence of violence and promote 
political stability.119 Thus, they made the political decision to request 
activation of the Court, hoping that it would indict former President 
Gbagbo and his closest allies, some of whom had fled, and would 
bring them to The Hague. Gbagbo himself was arrested; he awaits 
trial.120  
4. UN Security Council Referral 
When crimes occur in a state that has not ratified the Rome Statute 
and that does not assent to the Court’s jurisdiction, the drafters of the 
Rome Statute envisioned one possibility for the ICC to nonetheless 
be granted jurisdiction: a referral to the Court by the UN Security 
Council.121 This referral allows the ICC Prosecutor to investigate, 
regardless of whether the alleged human rights violation occurred in 
the territory or by the national of a state party to the Rome Statute.122 
The referral, however, must be based on a Chapter VII finding that 
the issue poses a threat to international peace and security.123  
The first UN Security Council referral occurred in 2005 when the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1593,124 which referred the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the Court.125 Acting on this referral, the 
 
 118. Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 12(3). Both former President Laurent 
Gbagbo and current President Alassane Ouattara submitted official declarations to 
that effect under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. 
 119. Matt Wells, What Will the ICC’s Legacy Be in Côte d’Ivoire?, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (July 19, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/19/what-will-icc-s-
legacy-be-c-te-d-ivoire. 
 120. Ivory Coast’s Laurent Gbagbo Appears at ICC in Hague, BBC NEWS (Dec. 
5, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16027845. 
 121. Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 13(b). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows the UN Security Council to take 
peaceful as well as military measures when it has deemed there is a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. These measures are binding on all 
Member States of the UN under Article 25 of the UN Charter. This is how the UN 
Security Council can take a measure that is binding on non-state parties to the 
Rome Statute: the source is the UN Charter rather than treaty law. U.N. Charter 
chs. V, VII. 
 124. Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in 
Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release 
SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur]. 
 125. S.C. Res. 1593, TBD, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
  
2013] JUSTICE AND REALPOLITIK IN LIBYA 799 
Prosecutor issued the first arrest warrant against a sitting head of 
state, Omar Al-Bashir, for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide against three ethnic groups in Darfur.126 Resolution 1593 
was the result of long negotiations in the Security Council. While 
supporting accountability efforts in Darfur, the United States initially 
intended to veto the resolution, strongly opposing the notion that 
states not party to the Rome Statute, like itself, could be subject to 
ICC jurisdiction.127 The United States, however, decided to abstain 
after the language of the resolution was modified to reaffirm the 
exclusive jurisdiction of non-state parties over their nationals.128 
Such negotiations highlight the political nature of activation and also 
the role of state- and self-interest in activation of the Court.  
B. UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL OF LIBYA TO THE ICC 
The situation in Libya represents the second ICC referral by the 
UN Security Council. After peaceful protests against Colonel 
Muammar Qadhafi spread outside of the eastern Libyan city of 
Benghazi in February 2011, security forces commanded by Colonel 
Qadhafi opened fire on the protestors.129 The violent clashes between 
the protestors and the security forces intensified, and by February 25, 
Qadhafi was ordering his security forces to conduct air raids on the 
unarmed protestors and conscripting foreign nationals from 
neighboring African countries to assist in the fight.130 The UN 
Security Council reacted by condemning and attempting to halt the 
ongoing use of violence.131 The day after Qadhafi ordered the air raid 
on protestors, the Security Council met in New York to call for an 
 
 126. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”), Case 
No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009); see also Prosecutor v. 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, 
Second Warrant of Arrest (July 12, 2010). 
 127. See INT’L CRISIS GRP., SUDAN: JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC 5 (July 17, 
2009), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/ 
sudan/Sudan%20Justice%20Peace%20and%20the%20ICC.pdf. 
 128. Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, supra note 124. 
 129. Libya Forces ‘Open Fire’ at Funeral, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 19, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011219811665897.html. 
 130. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry, Rep., to Investigate All Alleged Violations of 
International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 17th sess., 24, 
U.N. Doc A/HRC/17/44 (June 1, 2011). 
 131. Libya Protests: UN Security Council Condemns Crackdown, BBC NEWS 
(Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12548520. 
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immediate end to violence in Libya by passing Resolution 1970.132 
The UN Security Council also declared an arms embargo on Libya, 
as well as a travel ban and an asset freeze on Qadhafi, his family 
members, and his close aides.133 At the same meeting, the UN 
Security Council, by a unanimous vote, referred the situation in 
Libya to the ICC Prosecutor.134 The United States notably voted in 
favor of the resolution, rather than simply abstaining as it did in the 
case of Darfur.135 
The political decision to refer the case of Libya to the ICC resulted 
from a convergence of strategic interests among the UN Security 
Council members and the perception that the Court could be used as 
a tool of coercive diplomacy to help bring about an end to the 
conflict.136 On one level, several key members of the Security 
Council, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, 
had concluded that long-term peace and stability would be best 
promoted by regime change in Libya.137 As such, an indictment of 
Qadhafi would further the likelihood of regime change post-
conflict.138 Whether the remaining Security Council members sought 
regime change is uncertain. Several key members, including Russia, 
China, and Brazil, expressed concerns that a referral could hinder 
 
 132. S.C. Res. 1970, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) [hereinafter 
Resolution 1970]. 
 133. Id. paras. 9–21. 
 134. Id. para. 4. 
 135. See Mark Kersten, The US and the ICC: Towards a Closer Relationship?, 
JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Apr. 10, 2011), http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/04/10/the-
us-and-the-icc-towards-a-closer-relationship/. 
 136. See Adam M. Smith, The Emergence of International Justice as Coercive 
Diplomacy: Challenges and Prospects 1 (Harvard Human Rights Program, 
Working Paper No. 12-002, May 2012), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/ 
programs/hrp/documents/Smith.pdf (contrasting the situation in Libya with that of 
Darfur, where States were hesitant to make substantive commitments like assets 
freezes or arms embargos); see also LAWRENCE MOSS, THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: TOWARDS A MORE 
PRINCIPLED RELATIONSHIP 9 (March 2012) (discussing how timing affected the 
quick referral from states that were usually hostile toward the ICC). 
 137. Barack Obama et al., Libya’s Pathway to Peace, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 
15, 2011, at EDIT7. 
 138. See Colum Lynch, Security Council Sanctions Gaddafi, Authorizes  
Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2011, at A10; see also Ian Black, Libya Regime 
Change Is West’s Goal, but Doubts Remain over How to Achieve It, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/15/libya-regime-
change-analysis. 
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peace efforts, rather than deter Qadhafi.139 These states, however, did 
not have key strategic relationships with Libya and seemed 
ambivalent toward the role that the ICC might play in promoting an 
end to the conflict.140  
In addition, the act of diplomatic staff of Libya’s mission to the 
UN defecting to the National Transitional Council (“NTC”), the 
opposition body established by anti-Qadhafi forces in February 2011 
in Benghazi, and the mission’s call for referral to the ICC, likely 
played a key part in building support for Resolution 1970.141 Indeed, 
as soon as February 21, 2011, Libyan Deputy Ambassador Dabbashi 
renounced Qadhafi and requested an urgent meeting of the Security 
Council to discuss actions to address the situation in Libya.142 The 
Libyan mission to the UN then sent a letter to the Security Council 
president supporting a referral of Qadhafi to the ICC.143 The strong 
support of the Libyan diplomats likely quelled the fears of some 
states that are traditionally protective of sovereignty. States such as 
Russia, China, and India were likely concerned that a referral to the 
ICC of the Libyan case to the ICC would set a precedent for the 
further erosion of state sovereignty; however, given the competing 
claims for sovereignty by the NTC and Qadhafi’s government, the 
referral could have been cast as a quasi self-referral.144  
C. SYRIA CONFLICT NOT REFERRED TO THE ICC 
Despite the willingness of the UN Security Council to deploy the 
ICC to assist with bringing an end to the conflict in Libya, the UN 
 
 139. Lynch, supra note 138. 
 140. Cf. The U.N. Security Council and the Crisis in Syria, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L 
LAW (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.asil.org/insights120326.cfm (discussing the 
motivating factors for action in Libya and explaining how the broad interpretation 
of authority in Libya has had a chilling effect on proposed action in Syria). 
 141. See Edward Wyatt, Security Council Calls for War Crimes Inquiry in 
Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/ 
world/africa/27nations.html?_r=1. 
 142. U.N. Ambassador Dabbashi, Letter Dated 21 February 2011 from the 
Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to 
the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2011/102 (Feb. 21, 2011). 
 143. Wyatt, supra note 141. 
 144. Till Papenfuss, What if Syria Was Referred to the ICC?, IPI GLOBAL 
OBSERVATORY (June 20, 2012), http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/ 
309-what-if-syria-was-referred-to-the-icc.html. 
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Security Council has been unwilling to deploy the ICC in Syria.145 In 
the case of Syria, key member states of the UN Security Council 
disagree as to the strategic utility of involving the ICC, or of 
imposing other coercive measures like economic sanctions and an 
arms embargo.146 Syria is not a state party to the Rome Statute.147 As 
such, without a political decision to deploy the ICC, the Court sits on 
the sidelines of the conflict, having no jurisdiction, and thus no 
impact.  
Since protests began in Syria in March 2011, security forces of the 
Assad regime have, as of July 2012, reportedly killed more than 
14,000 people.148 Several reports by the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry149 and non-governmental organizations have 
provided evidence of repeated attacks on civilian populations and 
acts of torture150 and have called for a referral of the situation to the 
ICC.151 Nonetheless, more than fifteen months into the Syrian crisis, 
the UN Security Council has not taken any action. Vetoes by Russia 
and China prevented the Security Council from passing two strongly 
worded resolutions authorizing peaceful measures to end the conflict 
in Syria, let alone referring the situation to the Court.152 Russia and 
China both appear to oppose UN Security Council deployment of the 
ICC in the Syria conflict. Political motivations likely play a key role 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 87. 
 148. See Jill Dougherty, Clinton: World May Not Succeed in Syria, CNN (July 
1, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/01/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html? 
hpt=hp_t1. 
 149. An organization created by the UN Human Rights Council. 
 150. See Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, 21st sess., ¶¶ 39–46, 58–70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 ( Feb. 22, 2012). 
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TORTURE ARCHIPELAGO: ARBITRARY 
ARRESTS, TORTURE, AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN SYRIA’S UNDERGROUND 
PRISONS SINCE MARCH 2011 (2012). 
 151. See, e.g., Syria: Torture Centers Revealed, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 3, 
2012), http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2012/07/03/syria-torture-centers-revealed. 
 152. See Russia and China Veto UN Resolution Against Syrian Regime, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/05/russia-
china-veto-syria-resolution (reporting on the veto of a resolution that threatened 
sanctions); see also Paul Harris et al., Syrian Resolution Vetoed by Russia and 
China at United Nations, GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/04/assad-obama-resign-un-resolution 
(describing a failed resolution that called for the prime minister to resign). 
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in these countries’ opposition to intervention. Russian protection of 
the Assad regime, for instance, can be linked to Syria hosting 
Russia’s only Mediterranean naval base and thus being a strategic 
ally.153  
Russia and China’s opposition to adopting measures in Syria may 
also have been a reaction to the UN Security Council’s action in 
Libya. That is, Russia and China had initially opposed the referral of 
the Libyan situation to the ICC but then changed their position to 
support it.154 During the negotiations in February 2011, Russia had 
notably obtained the withdrawal of any language in the Security 
Council’s Resolution 1970 that would allow for the use of military 
force.155 When Resolution 1973 permitting the use of force was later 
introduced in March, Russia and China negotiated to restrict the 
scope of the authorization to use force.156 The regime change that 
resulted from NATO’s intervention in Libya reinforced Russia and 
China’s initial concerns.157 More generally, while military 
intervention may permit bringing individuals to justice,158 the 
legitimacy of this justice may be affected by the fact that it is 
grounded in the use of force.  
D. IMPACT OF SYRIAN AND LIBYAN CONFLICTS  
ON REFERRAL POLITICS 
In addition to making certain states more reluctant to support UN 
 
 153. Russia’s Shame, FIN. TIMES (May 31, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
b0b0a496-ab25-11e1-b875-00144feabdc0.html (arguing that the eventual fall of 
the Assad regime outweighs Russia’s present strategic interests in supporting 
Syria). 
 154. Colum Lynch, U.N. Votes to Impose Sanction on Gaddafi, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 27, 2011, at A10. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See David Scheffer, Fanning the Flames of Justice in Syria, PROJECT 
SYNDICATE (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fanning-
the-flames-of-justice-in-syria (discussing the provisions of the Security Council’s 
Libya resolution and prospects for similar language with regard to Syria). 
 157. See Ian Black, Syria Blasts Call for ICC Investigation by UN Human 
Rights Commissioner, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2011/dec/13/syria-icc-investigation-human-rights. 
 158. See Stephen J. Rapp, Remarks on International Justice and the Use of Force 
(Aug. 30, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/2010/ 
169465.htm (listing the use of force against the Nazi, Khmer Rouge, and Rwandan 
governments as precursors to criminal prosecutions). 
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Security Council referrals to the ICC, the Libyan situation combined 
with the Syrian situation has triggered a number of recent initiatives 
to minimize the political nature of ICC referrals. For instance, in 
October 2011, a number of experts meeting at a retreat on the future 
of the Court organized by the government of Liechtenstein 
specifically addressed this topic.159 Participants suggested that state 
parties should “[e]ngage in a discussion on the relationship between 
the Court and the UN Security Council, with a special focus on 
referrals of the Council to the Court. To this effect, a checklist of 
factors to be taken into account in relevant decision-making 
processes could be useful.”160 The idea was that this objective 
checklist of factors should be used to guide the policy makers, rather 
than their own subjective strategic interests. 
A number of smaller states have also recently pronounced themselves 
in favor of such an approach. The “Small Five” group of Costa Rica, 
Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland recently tabled a 
resolution for the UN General Assembly recommending that the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council consider “[r]efraining 
from using a veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”161 In light of a 
negative response from the veto-wielding states, however, the resolution 
was withdrawn in May 2012.162 These efforts show a gradual shift in 
thinking toward the UN Security Council’s ability to refer situations to 
the ICC, triggered by the Libyan situation.  
E. FUTURE OF ICC REFERRALS: TOWARD AN APOLITICAL SYSTEM? 
Depoliticizing the UN Security Council referral process may calm 
rising criticism of bias and double standards, and it would assist in 
 
 159. Press Release, ICC, Assembly of States Parties, ICC, Retreat on the future 
of the ICC (Oct. 10, 2011), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ 
Press+Releases/Press+Releases+2011/PR732. 
 160. Assembly of States Parties, Retreat on the Future of the International 
Criminal Court, ¶ 35, 10th Sess., Dec. 12-21, 2011, ICC-ASP/10INF.3, available 
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/ICC-ASP-10-INF.3-ENG.pdf. 
 161. United Nations, Draft Resolution on Improving the Working Methods of 
the Security Council, ¶ 20, G.A. 66th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/66/L.42 (Mar. 28, 2012). 
 162. See Press Release, United Nations General Assembly, Switzerland 
Withdraws Draft Resolution in General Assembly Aimed at Improving Security 
Council’s Working Methods to Avoid ‘Politically Complex’ Wrangling (May 16, 
2012), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/doc/2012/ga11234.doc.htm. 
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removing the current sense of unpredictability and inconsistency in the 
Security Council’s approach. However, completely removing from the 
political sphere the decision to refer a situation to the ICC is unrealistic 
and may not be beneficial in the long term. As evidenced by the 
unsuccessful efforts of the “Small Five,” the five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council do not intend to give up their veto right or 
their ability to determine their own strategic interests as they seek to use 
the Court in maintaining international peace and security. Moreover, the 
deployment of judicial mechanisms quite naturally has a strategic 
aspect, whether at the national or international level.  
The ICC is one of several tools available to restore and maintain 
international peace and security,163 and members of the Security 
Council should be able to determine whether the Court would be a 
useful tool in any given instance. Separating the activation of the 
ICC from international peace and security considerations will lead to 
less coordination between peace and accountability efforts.164 As 
such, isolating the ICC will likely make the ICC or Security Council 
action ineffective or even destabilize conflict-affected countries.  
Political interests inherently determine the deployment of justice; 
it is a political decision whether to use the tool of the ICC or other 
mechanisms of justice to promote peace and security. The ICC, 
especially in the view of realpolitik decision makers, can only be an 
effective tool if its deployment is politically controlled. However, 
once deployed, it must act independently to be an effective, albeit 
unpredictable and complicated, tool. This is what makes the ICC 
such a unique and potentially powerful instrument in maintaining 
international peace and security. 
IV. MANAGING JUSTICE 
Once deployed, what political constraints exist on the efforts of 
the ICC as it proceeds in indicting and prosecuting suspected 
criminals? 
 
 163. See generally Smith, supra note 136, at 2, 5, 21 (classifying ICC referrals 
as unique tools available to the U.N. Security Council that yield unpredictable 
results). 
 164. Cf. Bala Mohammed Liman, LSE IDEAS (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2012/01/1528/ (arguing that the political impact of the 
Court’s actions must be appreciated; otherwise, the ICC may intervene despite the 
potential impact of its actions on prospects of peace and stability). 
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A. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE COURT’S OPERATION 
Once the ICC is seized with jurisdiction over a case, the 
Prosecutor and judges of the Court act in complete independence. 
While the policy makers and states that activated the jurisdiction of 
the Court continue to have strategic interests in how the Court affects 
their other efforts to maintain peace and security, states have a very 
limited ability to manage the activities of the Court.  
The Court prides itself on remaining free from the strategic 
interests of those who activated its jurisdiction. Even when a matter 
is referred to the Court, the case will not proceed until the Prosecutor 
has made a determination that there is sufficient evidence to seek an 
indictment from the bench.165 In fact, former Prosecutor Luis Moreno 
Ocampo has specifically stated on many occasions that his office is 
only concerned with the interests of justice, not those of peace and 
security that are defended by other institutions.166  
The Rome Statute provides only one possibility for strategic 
political considerations to affect the operation of the Court. The UN 
Security Council can defer any situation already submitted to the 
ICC for a period of twelve months at a time under Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute.167 While only a minor deviation from complete 
independence of the Court, Article 16 recognizes the possibility of a 
need for a safety valve to temporarily delay the pursuit of justice in 
the interest of peace and security.168 It requires that a deferral occur 
 
 165. See Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Policy Paper  
on Preliminary Examinations, ¶¶ 34–37 (Oct. 4, 2010) (draft manuscript), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/E278F5A2-A4F9-43D7-83D2-
6A2C9CF5D7D7/282515/OTP_Draftpolicypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04101
.pdf (emphasizing that when the U.N. Secretary General submitted, accompanying 
a referral, the formal conclusions of a U.N. commission, the Office of the 
Prosecutor conducted its own independent investigation of the commission’s 
findings). See generally Communications, Referrals and Preliminary 
Examinations, ICC, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/ 
Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Comm+and+Ref/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2013) (“[W]hether 
a situation meets the legal criteria established by the Rome Statute . . . to warrant 
investigation by the court [is determined by] a preliminary examination . . . based 
on statutory criteria and the information available.”). 
 166. See, e.g., POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 8–
9. 
 167. Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 16. 
 168. See HEMI MISTRY & DEBORAH RUIZ VERDASCO, THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 14 (Mar. 16, 2012), 
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via a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.169 In practice, 
this has never been triggered, but there have been attempts to do so 
and to shift the power to delay prosecutions from the UN Security 
Council to the UN General Assembly.170  
As noted above, the Rome Statute negotiations reflected this 
tension between those states that wished for a court independent 
from international politics and those favoring an international court 
that would be an arm of the UN Security Council, or at least highly 
responsive to its direction.171 Surprisingly, despite knowing that the 
opportunity to influence the Court is very limited, policy makers 
have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court on numerous occasions.172 
This indicates that many see value in ICC prosecutions as a 
contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in spite of the 
Court’s independence. 
B. POLICY MAKERS AND THE OPERATION OF THE COURT 
While the independent actions of the ICC may often lead it to act 
in a manner that complements the efforts of policy makers to resolve 
a conflict, it has on more than one occasion acted in a manner that 
complicates those efforts. These situations heighten the tension 
between policy makers and advocates of the Court. The situations in 
 
available at http://www.pgaction.org/activity/2012/chatham-icc-sc.html. 
 169. Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 16. 
 170. See, e.g., Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the 
Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) Assembly of the African Union, 18th Sess., Doc. EX.CL/710(XX), ¶ 4 (Jan. 
29–30, 2012) (recognizing Sudan’s and Kenya’s efforts to delay prosecution under 
Article 16); see also DAPO AKANDE ET AL., AN AFRICAN EXPERT STUDY ON THE 
AFRICAN UNION CONCERNS ABOUT ARTICLE 16 OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
ICC 12 (2010) (characterizing a proposal by the African Union to amend Article 
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frame in the face of the UNSC’s failure to act . . . as reflecting . . . the extent and 
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proper sequencing of the two”). 
 171. MISTRY & VERDASCO, supra note 168 (describing Article 16 as a 
compromise and one of the Rome Statute’s most controversial provisions). 
 172. See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 89; cf. Ottilia Anna Maunganidze & 
Antoinette Louw, Mali: Implications of Another African Case as Mali Self-Refers 
to the ICC, ALLAFRICA (July 24, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/ 
201207240748.html (noting allegations that African self-referrals have been 
utilized to “cripple government adversaries rather than end impunity for grave 
crimes”). 
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Darfur, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire illustrate this point particularly 
well.  
In the case of Darfur, the Prosecutor initially focused on two 
Sudanese senior but not top-level officials, thereby carefully 
attempting not to alienate the Sudanese government.173 Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno Ocampo pursued a “small-step strategy,” proceeding 
gradually up the official ranks in requesting arrest warrants.174 
Despite Sudan’s refusal to cooperate after the Court issued the first 
two arrest warrants and its arguments that the ICC was impeding the 
peace process, the Prosecutor nonetheless continued his investigation 
and secured additional indictments, including that of Sudanese 
President Al-Bashir.175 Throughout the development of the small-step 
strategy and the deliberations on whether to indict a sitting president, 
the ICC operated free of the direction, control, and interests of the 
Security Council and others trying to bring an end to the conflict.176 
Even when circumstances changed and it appeared the indictments 
were standing in the way of meaningful peace negotiations, the ICC 
continued to issue indictments of key actors in Sudan.177 
Following the 2007–2008 post-election violence in Kenya, the 
ICC Prosecutor visited Kenya to discuss the proceedings with 
President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga in an effort to secure 
domestic cooperation. When the government did not make a referral, 
the Prosecutor obtained authorization from the Court to investigate 
based on the fact that Kenya was a state party to the Rome Statute.178 
 
 173. See ROYAL AFRICAN SOCIETY, COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE, AND 
THE ICC IN AFRICA, 30–31 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008). 
 174. See Int’l Justice Tribune, “The Small Steps Strategy” of the ICC in Darfur, 
RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (Mar. 5, 2007), http://www.rnw.nl/international-
justice/print/22939. 
 175. See MOSS, supra note 136, at 6–7. 
 176. See Int’l Justice Tribune, supra note 174 (describing Prosecutor Moreno 
Ocampo as “very independent”). 
 177. See Sarah Webb & Alexander Dziadosz, ICC Prosecutor Seeks Sudan 
Defense Minister’s Arrest, REUTERS, Dec. 2, 2011, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE7B121R20111202; see also 
MOSS, supra note 136, at 7 (“Many observers, including some UN officials, 
believe the investigation and arrest warrants have made peace negotiations more 
difficult, alienating both the Sudanese government and African leaders whose 
cooperation was essential.”). 
 178. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
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The ICC Prosecutor moved quickly and issued summonses to appear 
to three individuals on each side of the conflict within a year after the 
Court authorized the investigation.179 The involvement of the ICC in 
the Kenyan situation remains controversial, with some worried that it 
will destabilize a delicate political balance.180 Others believe that the 
ICC has been the only institution to break the hold of corrupt 
political figures on the Kenyan process and that it may serve as the 
catalyst to put Kenya on the track of responsible governance. 
The case of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates that, while the Court’s 
interactions with policy makers may initially be complementary, 
prosecutions on both sides may frustrate efforts to build long-term 
stability. Following the post-election crisis, the new government of 
Côte d’Ivoire formally sought the assistance of the Court and gave it 
jurisdiction under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute.181 As it did in 
Kenya, the ICC acted swiftly and issued an arrest warrant for former 
President Gbagbo. At that time, the ICC’s actions appeared in line 
with the strategic interests of the new government as well as those 
seeking to promote peace in Côte d’Ivoire by removing Gbagbo from 
the country. Subsequently, the ICC Prosecutor declared that both 
sides of the conflict had committed crimes and that prosecutions 
would take place on both sides.182 This development may or may not 
be in line with the strategic calculations of international policy 
makers on how best to continue to build stability in Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 2 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
 179. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 111. 
 180. See Kenya: Impact of the ICC Proceedings, supra note 113, at 10–11 
(explaining how the focus of the ICC on individuals coming from a certain region 
of Kenya has created a perception of bias and increased the risk for inter-
community violence). 
 181. Cote d’Ivoire had first accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction in a 12(3) 
declaration dated April 18, 2003, under President Gbagbo. This related to events 
since September 19, 2002. President Ouattara subsequently renewed this 12(3) 
declaration, modifying the dates for the ICC’s involvement to the gravest crimes 
committed since November 28, 2010. 
 182. See ICC Prosecutor Arrives in Ivory Coast to Probe Abuses, BBC NEWS (Oct. 
15, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15319222?print=true (reporting 
that the ICC judges’ decisions to allow the Prosecutor to conduct an inquiry in Côte 
d’Ivoire included a finding that both sides of the conflict had committed atrocity 
crimes); Mike Corder & Laura Burke, Laurent Gbagbo: International Criminal Court 
Charges Former Ivory Coast President With Crimes Against Humanity, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/30/laurent-gbagbo-
charged-icc_n_1120007.html. 
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C. OPERATION OF THE COURT IN LIBYA 
In Libya, the ICC Prosecutor maintained his course of action—
investigation, arrest warrants, and request for surrender—despite 
significant changes on the ground that affected prospects for peace. 
Once the ICC referral had been made, the judicial process could 
proceed in parallel to the military intervention. After more than two 
months of investigation, the Prosecutor requested that the ICC judges 
issue arrest warrants for Colonel Qadhafi, his son Saif Al Islam 
Qadhafi, and intelligence chief Abdullah Al-Senussi for the 
commission of murder and persecution of civilians as crimes against 
humanity.183  
During this time period, a military stalemate was slowly arising. 
From the viewpoint of policy makers, the issuance of an arrest 
warrant would make the negotiation of peace more difficult, as it 
would restrict Qadhafi’s options for leaving the country.184 The 
judges of the Court nevertheless issued the three arrest warrants on 
June 27, 2011.185  
Two months later, Tripoli was liberated by the forces opposing 
Qadhafi, and in October, Colonel Qadhafi was killed, which had the 
effect of terminating the ICC proceedings against him.186 Saif Al-
Islam and Abdullah Al-Senussi were captured and, since then, the 
ICC has been working to obtain their transfer to The Hague for 
prosecution.  
 
 183. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, The 
Office of the Prosecutor Will Request an Arrest Warrant Against Three Individuals 
in the First Libya Case. Judges Will Decide (May 4, 2011), available at 
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press 
%20releases%20%282011%29/pr659 [hereinafter Prosecutor Will Request an 
Arrest Warrant in Libya Case]. 
 184. Cf. Brett Schaefer, International Criminal Court Complicates Conflict 
Resolution in Libya, HERITAGE FOUND., June 9, 2011, at 2, http://thf_ 
media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/wm3287.pdf (postulating that the Obama 
administration’s interest in negotiating a prosecution-free exile for Qadhafi was 
precluded by the Prosecutor’s request for arrest warrants). 
 185. Situation in Libya, ICC, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20 
and%20cases/situations/icc0111/situation%20index?lan=en-GB (last visited Jan. 3, 
2013). 
 186. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC, 
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0111/ 
related%20cases/icc01110111/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
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Another aspect of the ICC Prosecutor’s approach to the Libyan 
situation may have surprised policy makers. Following reports of 
civilian casualties caused by NATO’s military campaign,187 the ICC 
Prosecutor declared that his office would investigate those 
allegations.188 Although the Prosecutor concluded that supporting 
evidence was insufficient, this reinforced the notion that the Court is 
intended to be blind to politics when proceeding with investigations. 
NATO members did not expect this response when leading the 
military intervention.189  
V. JUSTICE AND THE BATTLEFIELD 
To what extent do investigations or indictments by the ICC 
help legitimize the use of force to maintain international peace 
and security? 
Investigations and indictments by international justice 
mechanisms, such as the ICC, can and do influence actions on the 
battlefield by helping legitimize the use of force to maintain 
international peace and security.190 When one of the parties to a 
conflict is indicted for war crimes by an international tribunal, this 
collective act on behalf of member states of the international 
community can add legitimacy to the use of force by those states to 
bring about an end to the conflict. While an indictment does not 
require force and cannot compel force, it can support efforts to 
justify its use and to continue the use of force in the face of difficult 
 
 187. See Sebastian Moffett, NATO Downplayed Civilian Deaths in Libya – 
HRW, REUTERS, May 14, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/05/14/nato-libya-idAFL5E8GD21O20120514. 
 188. See Mark Kersten, Justice in Libya: Investigating NATO?, JUSTICE IN 
CONFLICT (May 21, 2012), http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/05/21/justice-in-libya-
investigating-nato/. 
 189. Cf. id. (detailing NATO’s sharp reaction to accusations of war crimes); 
Damien McElroy, Libya: Nato to be Investigated by ICC for War Crimes, 
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
africaandindianocean/libya/8866007/Libya-Nato-to-be-investigated-by-ICC-for-
war-crimes.html. 
 190. See Patrick Wintour, Cameron and Sarkozy Plan Libya Visit as G8 Says 
Gaddafi Must Go, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2011/may/27/g8-to-call-for-gaddafi-to-go (acknowledging that a statement by the 
G-8 welcoming the ICC Prosecutor’s request for arrest warrants would be “seen as 
a victory for the [sic] Sarkozy and Cameron following their decision to provide 
ground attack helicopters for use by NATO”). 
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military circumstances.  
A. THE STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN IMPARTIALITY  
At the same time, consideration must be given to the fact that 
justice is intended to be independent. Justice applies to the conduct 
of all actors involved in a conflict, and this indiscriminate approach 
often includes those seen as the “good guys”—those on whose behalf 
the international community intervenes—as well as those using force 
to bring an end to the conflict, such as NATO. Such indiscriminate 
justice is crucial to maintaining the independence and the 
effectiveness of international war crimes tribunals. 
In practice, however, this even-handedness may be imperfectly 
implemented. There appears to be a culture among international war 
crimes tribunals that requires them to find indictees on all sides of a 
conflict as a way of proving their impartiality.191 The ICC appears to 
reflect this culture and seems to go out of its way, at times, to try to 
find indictments on all sides to a conflict.192 This can obviously, and 
possibly unnecessarily, complicate efforts of the realpolitik policy 
makers to use force to bring an end to atrocity crimes–based 
conflicts. 
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia illustrates this tension 
between the legitimization of force and the commitment to provide 
justice to all actors in a conflict. In this case, the Yugoslav Tribunal 
indicted Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic during the 
Kosovo campaign, a move that added support to humanitarian 
intervention.193 This indictment helped to legitimize NATO’s use of 
 
 191. See, e.g., Abdul Tejan-Cole, Sierra Leone’s ‘not-so’ Special Court, in 
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE? THE DILEMMA OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA 240 
(Chandra Lekha Sriram & Suren Pillay eds., 2011) (describing the indictment of 
“Hinga” Norman, the former defense minister and head of the Civil Defense 
Forces of Sierra Leone, considered to be a war hero who fought on behalf of the 
government). 
 192. See, e.g., Kenya and the ICC: Brace Yourself, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21543589/print (describing indictments on both 
sides of the Kenyan election conflict); ICC Prosecutor Arrives in Ivory Coast to 
Probe Abuses, supra note 182. 
 193. See NATO Yugoslav Strikes Won’t Stop, Despite Indictments, CNN (May 
27, 1999), http://articles.cnn.com/1999-05-27/world/9905_27_kosovo.02_1_ 
batajnica-military-airport-nato-yugoslav-nato-spokesman-jamie-shea?_s=PM: 
WORLD (stating that NATO “welcomed” the indictments by the tribunal). 
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force, particularly when NATO extended its air campaign beyond 
Kosovo and into Belgrade, as well as when NATO considered 
deploying ground troops because of the perceived failure of its air 
strikes to end atrocities committed by Serbian forces.194 While 
NATO gained support for its offensive from the Yugoslav Tribunal’s 
indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, the acts of Kosovar armed units 
and the acts of NATO were subsequently investigated.195 In the case 
of NATO, the UN Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, assessing numerous 
complaints and allegations, concluded there was no basis to open an 
investigation.196 The investigation on the Kosovar armed units 
culminated in the indictment of seven Kosovars, although they were 
later acquitted or their charges were dropped.197 The Yugoslav 
Tribunal also decided not to pursue charges against NATO because it 
concluded that NATO’s acts did not constitute war crimes.198  
B. THE LIBYAN CONFLICT  
AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE 
The recent conflict in Libya highlights the tension between the 
justification of the use of force and the commitment to be perceived 
as applying justice even-handedly. Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo 
 
 194. See Nato to Send 8,000 Ground Troops to Albania, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 
1999), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/apr/08/balkans13/print (detailing the 
deployment of troops to Albania to provide military support to humanitarian 
efforts after “reports that Serb forces [were] waylaying refugees and herding them 
back to Kosovo, possibly for use as human shields”). 
 195. History, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/sid/95 (last visited Nov. 24, 2012). 
 196. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor’s Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign 
(June 13, 2000), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7846. 
 197. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case 
Information Sheet: Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj & Lahi Brahimaj 
(2012), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/cis/en/cis_haradinaj_ 
al_en.pdf (showing that Haradinaj and Balaj were found not guilty while Brahimaj 
was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment); International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Case Information Sheet: Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Isak 
Musliu & Haradin Bala, available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/cis/en/cis_ 
limaj_al_en.pdf (demonstrating that Limaj and Musliu were found not guilty, Bala 
was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment, and Murtezi was indicted). 
 198. U.N. Prosecutor Finds No Evidence of NATO War Crimes in Yugoslavia, 
CNN (June 2, 2000), available at http://wesleyclark.h1.ru/nato-icty.htm (quoting 
the chief U.N. war crimes prosecutor as “satisfied there was no deliberate targeting 
of civilians or any unlawful military targets during the NATO campaign”). 
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of the ICC moved quickly to open a case on March 3, 2011 in 
Libya199 following the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1970 
referring the situation to the Court.200 When the Prosecutor 
announced his decision to open an investigation into the situation in 
Libya,201 he effectively indicated to the international community that 
he had found a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against 
humanity had been committed in Libya since February 15.202 Several 
states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, 
used this March 3 decision to reinforce their public articulations of 
the moral basis for intervention.203 This suggests that Ocampo’s 
announcement played a role in bolstering the case for intervention. 
This quick action by the ICC in opening a case in Libya provided 
moral support to those seeking Chapter VII support from the UN 
Security Council to use force, and, as noted above, the UN Security 
Council did exercise this authority. On March 17, 2011, two weeks 
after the ICC Prosecutor had opened the case, Qadhafi was preparing 
to retake the city of Benghazi, broadcasting that his forces located 
sixty miles from Benghazi would show “no mercy and no pity” to 
those who would not give up resistance.204 A few hours later, the UN 
 
 199. Prosecutor Will Request an Arrest Warrant in Libya Case, supra note 183. 
 200. Resolution 1970, supra note 132, at 1–2. 
 201. Luis Moreno Ocampo, Statement of the Prosecutor on the opening of the 
investigation into the situation in Libya (Mar. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/035C3801-5C8D-4ABC-876B-C7D946B51F 
22/283045/StatementLibya_03032011.pdf. 
 202. See Rome Statute, supra note 73, art. 53(1)(a) (“In deciding whether to 
initiate an investigation, the prosecutor shall consider whether the information 
available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed.”). 
 203. See Obama Urges Gadhafi to Step Down; International Criminal Court 
Launches Inquiry (PBS television broadcast Mar. 3, 2011), transcript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june11/libya1_03-03.html (expressing 
President Obama’s desire for Qadhafi to leave Libya to avoid “defenseless 
civilians . . . finding themselves trapped and in grave danger,” and Senator 
McCain’s belief that “people have God-given rights . . . not to live under a brutal 
dictator that’s willing to slaughter and massacre his own citizens to stay in 
power”); Letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van 
Rompuy (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ 
mar/10/libya-middleeast (calling on Qadhafi to leave Libya and rebuking the use 
of military force on citizens as “unacceptable”). 
 204. See U.N. Okays Military Action on Libya, REUTERS, Mar. 17, 2011, 
available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/17/uk-libya-idUKLDE71Q0MP 
20110317. 
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Security Council, with Resolution 1973, intervened a second time, 
this time with harsher measures: it authorized the use of military 
force in Libya.205 The resolution also instituted a no-fly zone, an 
arms embargo, and an asset freeze.206  
As noted, the UN Security Council’s decision to refer the Libyan 
situation to the ICC set the groundwork for the moral approval of the 
use of force. The UN Security Council’s authorization of the use of 
force is a relatively uncommon act.207 The use of military force is 
intended as a method of last resort, when non-military measures have 
been tried and have not worked, or are not likely to work. The 
Security Council’s referral to the Court can therefore help push the 
use-of-force process forward by delegitimizing a ruler.208 In 
depicting Qadhafi as a possible criminal of mass atrocities, the 
Security Council further isolated him from the international 
community.209 Though it is difficult to quantify the extent to which 
the Court’s intervention played a role when measured against a 
variety of other strategic considerations, it is clear that this 
intervention bolstered the moral basis for the NATO-led military 
intervention. Supporters of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 
have justified the authorization of the use of force on the grounds 
that Qadhafi continued to commit crimes against the civilian 
population, which had led to the referral of the situation to the ICC in 
Resolution 1970.210 
 
 205. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 4, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) 
[hereinafter Resolution 1973] (authorizing Member States to take “all necessary 
measures” to protect civilians and enforce a no-fly zone). 
 206. Id. ¶¶ 6, 13, 19. 
 207. For instance, the use of force has previously been approved in Iraq, Kuwait, 
Yugoslavia, and Haiti. 
 208. See, e.g., Brendan Leanos, Cooperative Justice: Understanding the Future 
of the International Criminal Court Through Its Involvement in Libya, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2267, 2291–92 (2012) (referring to “delegitimizing criminal 
regimes” as a general objective of the ICC). 
 209. See Carsten Stahn, Libya, the International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 325, 329–30 (2012) (characterizing the 
U.N. referral and ICC warrants as achieving the purpose of isolating the Qadhafi 
regime, but also as “raising concerns regarding the prospects of a negotiated 
solution”). 
 210. See, e.g., Libya: David Cameron on UN Resolution in Full, TELEGRAPH 
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaand 
indianocean/libya/8390415/Libya-David-Cameron-on-UN-Resolution-in-full.html 
(alleging that Qadhafi had ignored the demands of Resolution 1970 and was 
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This authorization to “take all necessary measures” to protect 
civilians laid the groundwork for the NATO campaign.211 The day 
after Resolution 1973 was adopted, U.S. President Barack Obama 
emphasized that Colonel Qadhafi had a choice and that military 
action could be avoided if Qadhafi implemented an immediate cease-
fire and stopped the advance of troops on Benghazi.212 Qadhafi did 
not heed the warning, and the next day, on March 19, a British-
French-led coalition launched an air campaign designed to protect 
the people of Libya against Qadhafi’s forces.213 
As the military intervention proceeded, so too did the judicial 
process against Qadhafi, providing constant reminders in the 
international arena that the military intervention was targeting a man 
and his regime that were allegedly committing mass atrocities 
against the civilian population. As with the Prosecutor’s March 2011 
decision to open an investigation, his May arrest warrants for 
Qadhafi, Qadhafi’s son, and Abdullah Al-Senussi supported and 
legitimized public articulations of the moral basis for intervention 
heralded by states, including the United States, United Kingdom, and 
France.214  
The ICC approved these three arrest warrants on June 27, 2011, 
the NATO campaign’s 100th day.215 This move further reinforced the 
notion that military action against such individuals could be 
acceptable because the Court’s judges had deemed that sufficient 
evidence existed to grant the Prosecutor’s request.216 The campaign 
 
“preparing for a violent assault” on Libyan citizens). 
 211. Resolution 1973, supra note 205, ¶ 5. 
 212. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the 
President on the Situation in Libya (Mar. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-
situation-libya. 
 213. See Libya: US, UK and France Attack Gaddafi Forces, BBC NEWS (Mar. 
20, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12796972?print=true. 
 214. See Nicholas Watt, Obama and Cameron Agree to ‘Turn up Heat’ on 
Gaddafi, GUARDIAN (May 25, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/ 
25/obama-cameron-turn-heat-gaddafi (reporting that after the arrest warrants were 
issued, Obama stated, “We will continue . . . operations until Gaddafi’s attacks on 
civilians cease. Time is working against Gaddafi and he must step down from 
power and leave Libya to the Libyan people”); Wintour, supra note 190. 
 215. Situation in Libya, supra note 185. 
 216. See Paul Koring, Arrest Warrant for Gadhafi a New Complication for 
NATO, GLOBE & MAIL (June 27, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/ 
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continued past Qadhafi’s indictment for another four months until 
October 2011, when he was captured and killed. 
By the end of the conflict, both NATO and the NTC were under 
the Court’s watchful eye.217 In the case of the NTC, supervision by 
the ICC was a way of signaling that the rules of war should apply to 
each side consistently. To that end, the Prosecutor also investigated 
NATO’s actions, although he found there was no evidence to 
conclude that NATO had intentionally directed attacks against 
civilians or launched attacks that were excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage.218 
The experience in Libya demonstrates the constant tension 
between an international tribunal’s ability to legitimize the use of 
force by the “good guys” in a conflict and the tribunal’s commitment 
to apply justice indiscriminately to all actors. Although an indictment 
cannot compel action on the part of member states, it sends a 
message of solidarity against the indicted party. At the same time, 
international tribunals, including the ICC, are careful to examine all 
aspects of a conflict and remain ready to assign blame to those very 
“good guys” whose actions were tacitly supported by the indictments 
issued from these organs of international justice.  
VI. JUSTICE AND THE PEACE TABLE 
To what extent do actions by the ICC promote or inhibit 
efforts to reach a negotiated solution to a conflict threatening 
international peace and security? 
Actions by the ICC can both promote and inhibit efforts to reach a 
negotiated solution to a conflict threatening international peace and 
 
world/arrest-warrant-for-gadhafi-a-new-complication-for-nato/article4261900/ 
(noting that, while the arrest warrants legitimized NATO’s use of military force, 
their issuance also created a “quandary . . . [because] [l]etting Col. Gadhafi escape 
might shorten the war and reduce the bloodshed, but it would also mean flouting 
ICC warrants”). 
 217. See International Court to Probe Nato Action in Libya, CHANNEL 4 NEWS 
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.channel4.com/news/international-court-to-probe-nato-
action-in-libya. 
 218. Press Release, Security Council, International Criminal Court Chief Tells 
Security Council Libya Wants Domestic Courts to Handle Proceedings Against 
Son of Former Libyan Leader Qadhafi, U.N. Press Release SC/10651 (May 16, 
2012). 
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security, depending on the particular circumstances of the conflict.219 
In certain situations, the Court’s actions can help delegitimize a party 
on the world stage and therefore provide moral clarity for policy 
makers seeking to negotiate the surrender of the aggressor.220 At the 
same time, when the key member states of the international 
community want to accommodate the aggressor as a strategic 
maneuver to achieve long-standing peace and stability, it may be 
more difficult—or they may be barred from doing so—because the 
aggressor is under investigation or indicted for atrocity crimes.221  
A. PROLONGING NEGOTIATIONS 
Several recent case studies demonstrate this dilemma. For 
instance, some policy makers believe that an indictment can actually 
prolong a conflict, leading to more deaths, injuries, and displacement 
of the civilian population.222 Some hold this position with respect to 
 
 219. Compare BRIONY MACPHEE & SHANNON FRANK, THE CURRENT 
INVESTIGATION BY THE ICC OF THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2006), 
available at http://amicc.org/docs/Northern%20Uganda%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf 
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International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor (Apr. 5, 2011), available  
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 220. See Leanos, supra note 208, at 2291–92; Nino Saviano, Moral Clarity 
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may involve granting amnesty from prosecutions, which is no longer an option 
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Sudan and the ICC’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar Al-
Bashir.223 Similarly, the indictment of LRA leader Joseph Kony may 
be a contributing factor to why he has remained at large in the bush 
for several years as the conflict continues, even though, in his case, it 
is not clear that he would be willing to negotiate had the indictment 
never been issued.224 The ICC indictment of General Bosco 
Ntaganda, however, has had little impact on his role within the DRC. 
It did not prevent him from continuing to play an active role in the 
DRC’s prolonged conflict, first as a rebel, then general, and then 
rebel again.225 It was not until after his defection from the 
government that an order for his arrest was made.226 
Instances of this tension with respect to indictments by an 
international tribunal are not restricted to the African continent. In 
Kosovo, for instance, the Yugoslav Tribunal indicted Slobodan 
Milosevic, a move that nearly forced NATO to risk the lives of 
soldiers in a possible ground war.227 Some policy makers instead 
preferred to negotiate with Milosevic and were therefore resentful of 
the indictment.228 In the end, however, Russian envoy Viktor 
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Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, the European 
Union’s envoys to Yugoslavia, still managed to negotiate a surrender 
of Kosovo with Milosevic, and a ground war was avoided.229 
As these case studies demonstrate, the actions of the ICC can 
prevent negotiations—or at least limit how they can take place. Some 
states lament these limitations on the pursuit of negotiations and 
strategic diplomacy as possible solutions to the conflict.230 Others 
support the role of the ICC in putting an end to any type of 
bargaining with an aggressor even if that will likely disrupt 
diplomatic attempts at a solution.231  
Adding to the complexity of this dilemma is the fundamental 
purpose of the Court. While the ICC can indeed be used as a tool by 
the UN Security Council to further its mandate of promoting peace 
and security, justice is its primary goal. To that end, once the Court is 
called upon and its jurisdiction is triggered, its involvement cannot 
be stopped to enable a political deal to be struck. This can be seen 
with the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic mentioned above. 
Provisions in the Rome Statute support this point. For instance, the 
Rome Statute specifically provides that the withdrawal of a country 
from the Rome Statute does not affect the consideration of a matter 
that was already under consideration by the ICC.232 Furthermore, 
such a state remains obliged to cooperate with criminal proceedings 
commenced prior to the withdrawal.233 The rationale here is that the 
Court’s mandate to promote justice is greater than its protection of 
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peace and security.234 Indeed, as remarked upon by the former ICC 
Prosecutor, “[t]here is a difference between the concepts of the 
interests of justice and the interests of peace . . . . [The] matter of 
international peace and security is not the responsibility of the 
Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate of other institutions.”235 
B. LIBYA, THE ICC, AND THE PEACE TABLE 
The recent situation in Libya provides another instance of the 
Court’s ability to preclude an orchestrated diplomatic strategy. In this 
case, by mid-2011, the parties on the ground were quickly 
approaching a political and military stalemate.236 As a result, 
realpolitik policy makers started to float the idea of Qadhafi stepping 
down or going into exile as possible solutions to the stagnation.237 In 
late July, as the military conflict was at its height, a shift in political 
discourse occurred. Previously, the leaders of the military campaign 
had consistently called on Colonel Qadhafi to leave Libya. By late 
July, some policy makers, such as French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Alain Juppé, suggested that Qadhafi could stay in Libya on 
the condition of giving up all political activity in the country.238 At 
the time, policy makers were starting to realize that to negotiate a 
ceasefire to halt the violence, Qadhafi would need to step down and 
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be immune from prosecution by the Court.239  
In the context of these evolving perspectives on the conflict in 
Libya, the ICC Prosecutor stepped in to remind the decision makers 
of the outstanding arrest warrant.240 Other actors, including non-
governmental organizations and various states, also reminded 
countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States 
that the arrest warrants were outstanding.241 These actions indeed 
precipitated a policy shift. Shifting course once again, states 
including the United Kingdom and France, who headed the NATO 
mission in Libya, invoked the indictment by the Court to back away 
from the negotiations on the grounds that Qadhafi was now a wanted 
war criminal. Accordingly, policy makers were forced into a rapid 
retreat from a path of common practice in the realpolitik world, 
effectively crossing out an entire chapter of their playbook.  
In addition to stifling a diplomatically negotiated solution, the 
Court’s involvement limits the availability of immunity as an option 
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to cease the military conflict. Once an individual is subject to an 
arrest warrant, all state parties, by virtue of their obligation to 
cooperate with the Court,242 are required to facilitate the surrender of 
this person to the Court.243 This obligation implies that state parties 
cannot welcome those individuals who have been indicted by the 
ICC into their sovereign territories. In practice, this means that states 
not party to the Rome Statute, such as Russia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
and Venezuela, could have technically welcomed Qadhafi on their 
soil, but state parties could not do so. However, the ICC’s competing 
interpretation of the Rome Statute is that the obligation to cooperate 
extends not only to state parties of the Rome Statute, but also to all 
UN member states when the Court’s jurisdiction is triggered by the 
UN Security Council,244 as was the case in Libya.  
VII. JUSTICE AND POST-CONFLICT STABILITY 
To what extent do conflicts or synergy arise between the ICC 
and national efforts to prosecute those responsible for crimes, 
and how does this affect post-conflict stability? 
Tensions also arise between states and the ICC because they both 
have the ability to bring prosecutions against those responsible for 
serious violations of international criminal law. The relationship 
between domestic and international organs of prosecution is very 
sensitive and can enhance, complicate, or even undermine post-
conflict stability. This relationship is also subject to change over 
time. For instance, while the victim party to a conflict often 
welcomes the involvement of the ICC during a conflict, this 
welcome may rapidly cool if the accused emerges victorious.245  
A. NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND HYBRID TRIBUNALS 
Many states have a strong desire to prosecute at the national 
level.246 This preference often arises from the notion that a post-
conflict state needs to exercise its sovereignty and address problems 
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internally to heal and move forward.247 It may also be due to the 
particular penalties permitted under a state’s domestic code that are 
unavailable at the international level. For instance, Rwanda was the 
only state to vote against the Rwanda Tribunal, in part, because 
Rwandan policy makers knew they could not seek the death penalty 
in an international tribunal, whereas they could under the Rwandan 
domestic code.248 Similarly, following the 2003 liberation by 
coalition forces, the Iraqi Interim Governing Council favored 
prosecution at home, where it could and did use the death penalty 
against those convicted of serious crimes.249  
Other states embrace any efforts to get those criminally 
responsible out of town and therefore welcome intervention by the 
ICC.250 For instance, policy makers from Côte d’Ivoire supported the 
ICC’s recent opening of an investigation into the 2010 post-election 
violence.251 As recently as February 2012, rivals from both sides of 
the conflict supported the Court’s decision to extend its investigation 
back to crimes committed since 2002.252 
Yet, even for those states that initially supported the actions of the 
ICC, controversy can arise over whether the Court is a destabilizing 
force. As noted above, the Ugandans have started to voice concerns 
regarding their preference for local justice in light of the ICC’s 
inability to detain LRA leader Joseph Kony seven years after the 
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Court issued the original warrant against him.253 Similarly, in Kenya, 
there is a strong voice of discontent within the government against 
the Court’s role in the prosecution of those most responsible for 
violence following the 2007 election.254 This difference of opinion 
regarding prosecutions at the national and international levels helps 
to demonstrate why some states, such as Sierra Leone and Cambodia, 
have opted to use hybrid tribunals.255 
Although this tug of war between prosecutions at the Court and at 
the state level continues to some degree, there also appears to be a 
shift toward favoring prosecutions brought domestically to maintain 
peace and security.256 This trend may be based in part on emerging 
demands by states for the Court to respect the principle of 
complementarity, or deference to a national state for prosecution. 
Complementarity is enshrined in the Rome Statute and seeks to strike 
a balance between ending impunity on the one hand and respecting 
the primacy of domestic proceedings on the other.257 Consistent with 
this principle of complementarity, the ICC exists as a court of last 
resort, which only intervenes if a state cannot, or does not wish to, 
pursue domestic prosecutions.258 The Rome Statute affirms the 
principle that the jurisdiction of the Court is complementary to the 
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national criminal proceedings of its member states.259 The Court 
therefore only has authority to exercise jurisdiction when a state 
party to the Rome Statute is genuinely unwilling or unable to carry 
out the necessary investigations or prosecutions.260  
Accordingly, if the ICC is investigating or prosecuting a case, a 
state may resort to an admissibility challenge if it believes that it is 
able to try the case domestically.261 In such a challenge, the state 
would demonstrate that it is currently investigating or prosecuting, or 
has already investigated or prosecuted, the case.262 The Court then 
determines whether the state is willing and able to investigate or 
prosecute the case.263 The Court would also determine whether 
genuine investigations or proceedings against the same person for 
the same conduct at the national level has occurred or is occurring.264 
Despite this clearly delineated process, the ICC has its own 
institutional psychology, including self-preservation, so it may 
search for reasons to prosecute high-level indictees. In other words, 
the Court might be subconsciously biased against complementarity, 
despite its position as the arbiter of a state’s admissibility challenge. 
B. LIBYA, JUSTICE, AND POST-CONFLICT STABILITY 
Libya presents the most recent instance of a state asserting the 
principle of complementarity in support of its claim for prosecution 
on a national level. Despite the NTC’s initial support for the ICC’s 
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June 2011 indictment of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, following 
Qadhafi’s death and the end of the revolution, the NTC sought to 
assert its rights under the principle of complementarity to prosecute 
Saif Al-Islam Qadhafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi domestically.265 
As with the tribunal in Iraq, if these perpetrators are prosecuted 
domestically, then Libya can institute and employ the death penalty, 
whereas the ICC forbids this type of sentence.266 Domestic 
prosecution could also mean looking further back in time than 
February 2011, such that crimes committed by Qadhafi’s son and Al-
Senussi under Qadhafi’s forty-two-year rule could be included.267 A 
domestic court could also prosecute domestic crimes in addition to 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. These national 
prosecutions might demonstrate the capacity of the post-Qadhafi 
government to uphold justice and handle the aftermath of its conflict 
internally.268 Moreover, domestic prosecutions may be viewed as the 
only way to secure Libya’s full participation in the justice process 
because the Court lacks the ability to create a hybrid tribunal, a 
mechanism that was effective in Sierra Leone.  
The ICC, however, also seeks prosecution for Saif Al-Islam 
Qadhafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi.269 Accordingly, the Libyan 
government requested on January 23, 2012 that the Court postpone 
the request for Saif Al-Islam’s surrender pending the completion of 
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national proceedings in relation to other crimes he committed.270 The 
Court dismissed this request on March 7, 2012, and ordered instead 
that the government of Libya surrender Saif Al-Islam to the Court.271  
A few days after this ruling, news emerged from Tripoli of an 
agreement between the Libyan government and the Prosecutor of the 
ICC, whereby Saif Al-Islam Qadhafi could be tried in Libya “under 
ICC supervision.”272 Under this agreement, the Court would provide 
security and legal supervision. As attractive as this option may have 
sounded, however, the Rome Statute does not provide for the 
possibility of holding a domestic trial under the Court’s supervision. 
Discussions on this deal were therefore promptly replaced by 
discussions regarding an admissibility challenge.  
The Libyan government notified the Court on March 22, 2012 of 
its intention to challenge the admissibility of Saif Al-Islam’s case 
and requested that the Court suspend the request for Saif Al-Islam’s 
surrender for an additional few weeks until it could file its 
admissibility challenge.273 The Court, however, denied the Libyan 
government’s request to suspend the execution of the surrender 
request,274 a decision that the Appeals Chamber affirmed.275 The 
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Court made clear that Article 95, which the government was relying 
on to postpone the arrest warrant, only applies when an admissibility 
challenge is under consideration by the Court, and not when an 
admissibility challenge is forthcoming.276  
Accordingly, on May 1, 2012, the Libyan government filed its 
admissibility challenge contesting the Court’s jurisdiction over Saif 
Al-Islam.277 The admissibility challenge first noted that allowing the 
national jurisdictions to try Saif Al-Islam in Libya is consistent “with 
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, which accords primacy 
to national judicial systems.”278 The challenge also described the 
progress made with regard to the investigations into Saif Al-Islam’s 
conduct.279 It highlighted differences in the judicial system between 
the court system under the Ministry of Justice, which was generally 
seen as positive, and the special courts operated by Colonel 
Qadhafi’s security forces.280 The admissibility challenge further 
described Libya’s fair trial guarantees, as well as the manner in 
which due process guarantees applied throughout the various stages 
of a domestic criminal case.281 As of the date of writing, the Court is 
considering Libya’s admissibility challenge.  
This situation illustrates the tension between the Court and states 
with respect to prosecutions. On the one hand, it is important for a 
post-conflict state, such as Libya, to have national ownership over 
the proceedings. Such a process can promote reconciliation, develop 
a clear historical record, and contribute to the country’s transitional 
justice process. Libya is also trying to demonstrate that it is able to 
prosecute on the national level, as evidenced in part by the building 
of courtrooms and its handling of the trial of former intelligence 
chief Buzeid Dorda, who is currently on trial for crimes related to his 
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conduct in 2011.282  
On the other hand, there are indications that the Libyans are not 
able to conduct effective prosecutions. The government does not 
seem to have control over Saif Al-Islam, as he is imprisoned in 
Zintan, where the militia guarding him has vowed not to turn him 
over until the formation of a new government.283 The Libyans have 
also compromised their position with the ICC with their support of 
laws inconsistent with international standards. For instance, the 
National Transitional Council recently passed a controversial 
blasphemy law criminalizing the glorification of the former dictator 
or the spread of propaganda critical of the state.284 However, in June 
the Libyan Supreme Court found the law to be unconstitutional 
because it violated the freedom of expression.285  
Even before this admissibility challenge, Qadhafi had received 
retributive justice at the hands of the rebel forces, who in practice 
avoided an internal conflict over the handling of the fallen dictator. 
Qadhafi’s death demonstrates that no matter how much non-violent 
justice the Court may inject into the process, the reality remains that 
fighters may catch and kill those most criminally responsible. At the 
same time, the story circulating in Libya—that a young militiaman 
killed Qadhafi to avoid a clash between two anti-Qadhafi militias—
shows that realpolitik forces never cease to be at work. 
This emerging tension between the ICC’s desire to prosecute Saif 
Al-Islam Qadhafi and the Libyan government’s focus on dealing 
with the conflict on a national level has caused additional strains in 
the relationship between the two. For instance, the Registrar of the 
ICC made a mistake when it posted for two hours on the Internet a 
document that presented allegations that Saif Al-Islam Qadhafi had 
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been tortured.286 The document included a portion describing that the 
Registrar of the ICC asked him if he was mistreated, and he held up 
his injured hand.287 This posting infuriated the Libyan government. 
The Libyans likewise infuriated the international community by 
detaining Saif Al-Islam Qadhafi’s lawyer, Melinda Taylor.288 On 
June 7, 2012, four international civil servants working for the ICC 
were detained in Libya, where they had come to meet with Saif Al-
Islam.289 Taylor was arrested for allegedly attempting to pass 
documents directly addressing issues of Libya’s national security to 
Saif Al-Islam Qadhafi from a fugitive supporter, Mohammed 
Ismail.290 After weeks of pressure from the president of the ICC, 
Judge Sang-Hyun Song, and the UN Security Council and Australian 
government, the Libyans finally released Taylor.291 
It is possible that the Libyans could prosecute Saif Al-Islam on the 
national level for domestic crimes, while the ICC handles allegations 
of serious violations of international law, such as crimes against 
humanity. The drafters of the Rome Statute had indeed envisaged the 
possibility of a competing trial, as it allows for a state to postpone 
requests by the Court subject to its completion of a domestic 
prosecution.292 On its face, the Rome Statute would indeed appear to 
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allow the Libyan government to postpone the surrender request for 
Saif Al-Islam while it is prosecuting him for other crimes.293 On 
March 7, 2012, however, the Court found otherwise.294 The Court 
determined that once an arrest warrant for an individual is 
outstanding or a surrender request is issued, the Rome Statute 
requires the state to first surrender the person and then consult with 
the Court on the next steps.295 Accordingly, the Libyan government is 
first required to surrender Saif Al-Islam to the Court, and only then 
can it apply to have him surrendered back. 
The relationship between domestic and international organs of 
justice is one that is further refined with each additional case 
considered by the Court. The outcome of the Libyan government’s 
admissibility challenge and the Court’s reasoning for granting or 
denying, as the case may be, the government’s wish to try Saif Al-
Islam in Libya will be informative for countries that may seek 
domestic prosecution after a change of heart or pursuant to Security 
Council referral. The Libyan government’s response to the Court’s 
decision will also be a crucial moment in the Court’s history: should 
the Court deny Libya jurisdiction, there is not much the Court can do 
to enforce its decision if the Libyans decide to disregard the Court. 
This would further demonstrate the Court’s lack of teeth when a state 
is unwilling to cooperate. Here again the marriage between 
realpolitik and justice comes to the forefront, as realpolitik will be 
one of the real levers that powerful states may use to shift Libya’s 
attitude toward the Court.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
An examination of the role of the ICC in Libya has helped to 
further refine our understanding of the complex relationship between 
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the efforts of the ICC to promote justice and the ICC’s impact on the 
efforts of policy makers to promote peace and security. In the case of 
Libya, the Court has served many different roles and is affecting 
post-Qadhafi Libya in ways that were not predicted at its initial 
involvement. The Libyan case demonstrates many dilemmas with 
which the Court, its proponents, and policy makers are confronted. 
These dilemmas are not easily solved; however, there are six main 
conclusions that can be drawn. 
First, justice has become entwined within the fabric of conflict 
resolution. Over the past twenty years, the norm of justice and 
mechanisms to deliver justice, culminating in the creation of the ICC, 
have increasingly come to occupy space in what was previously the 
exclusive arena of realpolitik-oriented policy makers.  
Second, the activation of the mechanisms of justice remains in the 
hands of policy makers. In many cases, states have consented to the 
jurisdiction of the Court by becoming parties to the Rome Statute. 
They have thus pre-activated the ICC in the event there is an 
atrocity-based conflict associated with their territory or their 
nationals, thereby giving substantial discretion to the ICC. In other 
cases, the state (non-parties) must make a political determination to 
request that the ICC take up the matter, or it must be referred by a 
Chapter VII vote of the UN Security Council.  
Third, once the ICC or other mechanisms of justice are activated, 
they operate as truly independent mechanisms. The fundamental 
premise of effective justice is that it be applied and administered 
impartially. While it is a political reality that the ICC can only be 
activated via a political decision, it is also a judicial reality that 
judicial mechanisms eschew political influences and considerations. 
In part because the ICC is activated through a political 
determination, the ICC is all the more protective of its independence 
once activated. While this independence leads to the effective 
operation of justice, it does add a degree of unpredictability to the 
mix and can be unsettling for policy makers seeking to maintain 
international peace and security. 
Fourth, the investigation and indictment of those responsible for 
atrocity crimes can lend significant moral authority to the use of 
force to end them. Indictments may also provide the necessary moral 
guidance when international support for the continued use of force 
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wanes. The ICC’s drive for moral equivalence and penchant for 
indicting all sides to prove its impartiality, however, may result in a 
chilling effect on the initial use of force or may erode the moral 
authority for continued engagement on behalf of the victims. 
Fifth, the ICC may limit the ability of policy makers to halt an 
intervention and negotiate a peace settlement if the ICC has indicted 
the head of state or other top-level officials. While this may constrain 
the options of policy makers, there is also a lengthy record of failed 
efforts at accommodation and appeasement by policy makers, and in 
the end this constraint may do more to promote lasting peace and 
security.  
Sixth, in the post-conflict state, the ICC and domestic forms of 
justice can play key roles in reconciliation and aiding long-term 
peace and security. There is, however, an emerging tension between 
the ICC and domestic policy makers who prefer domestic 
accountability, and who have developed reservations about the 
manner in which the ICC operates. 
Since its creation, the Court has emerged as a dynamic and 
seemingly ever-present force exerting its influence on the traditional 
processes for resolving international conflicts and maintaining peace 
and security. On the whole, this influence positively promotes long-
term peace and security. As realpolitik-oriented policy makers and 
diplomats continue to refine their understanding of the operation of 
the Court and develop a more nuanced approach to maximizing the 
utility of the independent actions of the Court, they are likely to 
realize an enhanced ability to resolve international conflicts and 
promote long-term peace and stability. Failure to develop an 
adequate understanding of the role of the Court and mechanisms of 
justice will only further complicate an already complex environment 
and may undermine otherwise effective approaches to maintaining 
peace and security. 
 
